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Abstract: We present a new class of models of players’ reasoning in non-cooperative games,
inspired by David Lewis’s account of common knowledge. We argue that the models in this
class formalise common knowledge of rationality in a way that is distinctive, in virtue of
modelling steps of reasoning; and attractive, in virtue of being able to represent coherently
common knowledge of any consistent standard of individual decision-theoretic rationality.
We contrast our approach with that of Robert Aumann (1987), arguing that the former avoids
and diagnoses certain paradoxes to which the latter may give rise when extended in particular
ways.
11. INTRODUCTION
It is a fundamental assumption of standard game theory that each player of a game acts
rationally and that this is common knowledge amongst them – in short, that there is common
knowledge of rationality (CKR). In most day-to-day applications, this assumption is not
explicit; analysis is conducted using recognised ‘solution concepts’, such as Nash equilibrium
or iterated deletion of dominated strategies. But one of the core foundational enterprises of
standard game theory has been to investigate the implications of CKR for players’ strategy
choices and beliefs, and there has been a long-standing presumption that acceptable solution
concepts ought at least to be consistent with CKR.
Intuitively, CKR seems a meaningful idealisation, in the same sense that perfect
competition is a meaningful idealisation in economics or frictionless surfaces are in
theoretical mechanics. However, attempts to formalise the assumption are notoriously liable
to generate paradoxical implications, for example when the concept of rationality that is
assumed to be common knowledge includes some principle of ‘admissibility’ or ‘caution’.
The results we have in mind are, in our view, not just surprising or technically challenging,
nor best seen as merely raising doubts about particular conceptions of rationality. Instead, we
think they pose fundamental questions about how CKR should be modelled.
In this paper, we propose a new and distinctive approach to modelling CKR. Our
modelling strategy is inspired by Lewis (1969). Although Lewis is widely credited with the
first precise definition of common knowledge, it is less well known among game theorists that
this definition is only one component of a detailed analysis in which processes of reasoning
that are accessible to rational individuals are represented explicitly. Lewis’s concept of
common knowledge is not simply (or even at all) a specification of what individuals know
about one another’s knowledge, but instead forms part of an account of their reasoning about
one another’s reasoning. Building on an analysis of Lewis’s game theory by Cubitt and
Sugden (2003), we formalise and extend Lewis’s approach to represent how individual
players may reason about the standards of practical – that is, decision-theoretic – rationality
that they and other players endorse, and in this way reach conclusions about whether specific
strategies are or are not rationally playable.
Our formalisation comprises a new class of ‘common-reasoning models’ for
noncooperative games. In a model of this kind, players have access to a specific mode of
reasoning, ‘common reason’, which constitutes the common rationality being modelled and
2which embeds some standard of practical rationality. Our formalisation of a mode of
reasoning specifies what is taken as given, and what inferences are permitted, by that mode.
For a given game and a given standard of practical rationality, the common-reasoning model
specifies that this standard is taken as given by common reason, and specifies the inferences
that common reason permits, and how the mode of reasoning of each individual relates to
common reason. In doing so, the model represents explicitly the steps of reasoning by which
players can arrive at conclusions about the rational permissibility or impermissibility of
strategies. For a given strategy, there are three possibilities: either the permissibility of the
strategy can be established by common reason; or its impermissibility can be so established;
or neither its permissibility nor its impermissibility can be so established. In using this trinary
partition of strategies, the solution concepts supported by our approach are quite different
from those that are normally discussed in game theory.
1
Many existing solution concepts (for example, those based on iterated deletion of
weakly dominated strategies) can be described by algorithms – that is, step-by-step
procedures for finding the relevant solution. In interpreting such algorithms, game theorists
sometimes suggest that each player could find the solution for herself by working through the
same steps, with the implication that the algorithm might track the players’ own reasoning.
But the Lewisian project of representing CKR as reasoning requires more than this. If what
is to be represented is common knowledge of rationality, that reasoning must be capable of
being understood as rational or valid. Puzzling or paradoxical features of conventional
solution concepts are often mirrored by steps in the corresponding algorithms that seem not to
be describable as steps of valid reasoning. (See Cubitt and Sugden, 2011, for discussion of
this.) In contrast, our concept of a common-reasoning model is built out of explicitly-defined
1
The spirit, but not the formal structure, of our approach has some affinities with that of
Binmore’s (1987, 1988) analysis of ‘eductive reasoning’, further developed by Anderlini
(1990). In Binmore’s model, each player is represented by a Turing machine. In order to
make a rational choice among strategies, each machine attempts to simulate the reasoning of
the other machines. Binmore interprets the resulting infinite regress as demonstrating that
‘perfect rationality is an unattainable ideal’ (1987: 204–209). Bacharach (1987) presents a
related argument, questioning whether, even in games with unique Nash equilibria, the
playing of equilibrium strategies can always be justified by the players’ own reasoning. Like
Binmore and Bacharach, we ask what conclusions players can reach by their own reasoning,
without presupposing any general properties that those conclusions should satisfy. However,
our Lewisian method of modelling reasoning is very different from those used by Binmore
and Bacharach, and allows us to derive positive results about the conclusions players can
reach.
3axioms and inference rules, the rationality or validity of which can be assessed independently
of their roles in generating particular solutions.
We show that, for any game and any coherent standard of practical rationality, the
relevant common-reasoning model provides a consistent rendition of CKR. By doing so, we
achieve a complete separation between what it is for some conception of practical rationality
to be common knowledge and the substantive content of that conception. Since a standard of
practical rationality can coherently include appropriately formulated principles of caution, our
approach guarantees the compatibility of such principles with CKR. Moreover, for any
internally consistent conception of rationality (cautious or otherwise), our approach has a
built-in defence against any charge that the conclusions players draw about the rational
playability or otherwise of particular strategies are paradoxical. For every common-reasoning
model, we can not only show that the players’ reasoning is consistent; we can also show, for
every strategy whose permissibility or impermissibility is established, a specific line of
reasoning which players might use to reach that conclusion. Although we will show that this
line can conveniently be tracked using an algorithm that we present, it is the common-
reasoning model, and not the algorithm, which represents the reasoning.
The distinctiveness of the Lewisian approach can best be understood by comparison
with more conventional representations of CKR. The approach to modelling CKR that has
been seen by most game theorists as canonical is the formalisation due to Aumann (1987,
1999a, 1999b). Aumann calls his approach ‘Bayesian’. For convenience, we will follow him
in using that term in this way.
2
An important objective of our paper is to explain the
fundamental differences between the two approaches.
Aumann (1987) offers a Bayesian framework which he sees as providing formal
foundations for a solution concept, correlated equilibrium, which generalises Nash
equilibrium. The central assumption of the model is that ‘it is common knowledge that all the
players are Bayesian utility maximizers’ (2), which Aumann treats as synonymous with there
being ‘common knowledge of rationality’ (12). The model describes a situation in which, at
every state of the world, each player’s choices are decision-theoretically rational, given her
2
In doing so, we are not taking any position about Bayesian doctrine. Some theorists may
think that other formulations of CKR are more ‘Bayesian’ than Aumann’s. For example,
Aumann’s approach uses concepts of both belief and knowledge, but some theorists might
claim that a Bayesian approach should be entirely subjective. Aumann uses only standard
probabilities, while some more recent ‘Bayesian’ models allow lexicographic probability
systems. For reviews of different approaches, see Bonanno (2012) and Perea (2012).
4beliefs, and represents that situation as common knowledge. Any model of this kind implies a
binary partition of the set of strategies: one element of this partition contains those strategies
that are played in some state(s) of the world, while the other contains those that are played in
none. At every state, it is common knowledge that strategies that belong to the second
element are not played. Crucially, however, this modelling strategy does not attempt to
specify the steps of reasoning by which the players might discover the partition for
themselves. On a natural interpretation, there is an implicit assumption that each player
arrives at this partition by some process of reasoning from premises that represent (even if
they are not limited to) the idea that ‘Bayesian utility maximisation’ is common knowledge.
But, this process is not itself modelled. Thus, the Aumann approach is quite different from the
Lewisian one that we develop, in which premises and steps of reasoning are specified
explicitly.
This fundamental feature of Aumann’s original model is retained in many subsequent
developments of his approach. For example, Aumann (1999a) provides a ‘dictionary’ which
allows the set-theoretic concepts of the original ‘semantic’ model to be translated into
‘syntactic’ equivalents. The syntactic version of the model allows propositions about the
world, and about individuals’ knowledge about the world, to be represented by linguistic
formulae. The set-theoretic axioms of the semantic model are translated into axioms which
require consistency among knowledge propositions and between knowledge and truth. The
result is a syntactic description of what individuals know in the situation that is being
modelled, satisfying certain properties of internal consistency. There is still no representation
of the reasoning by which individuals arrive at this knowledge.
Although Aumann’s model is logically consistent, apparently natural extensions of it,
intended to introduce different conceptions of practical rationality involving principles of
admissibility or caution, turn out to generate puzzles and even contradictions in some games
(Börgers and Samuelson, 1992; Samuelson, 1992; Cubitt and Sugden, 1994). Given the
generality of our results about the consistency of common-reasoning models, it is natural to
ask whether Aumann’s way of modelling CKR is vulnerable to paradoxes in some way that
the Lewisian approach is not. Our paper explores this issue.
In doing so, we recognise that Aumann’s formulation of CKR can be amended in
ways that avoid some of the paradoxes associated with admissibility and weak dominance.
For example, Monderer and Samet (1989) use a set-up similar to that of Aumann (1987), and
explore the properties of a concept of ‘almost common knowledge’ as complete common
5knowledge is approached. A different way of representing ‘almost certain’ beliefs is
developed by Brandenburger (2007) and Brandenburger et al. (2008), who amend Aumann’s
model by using lexicographic probability systems in place of Bayesian probabilities. Each of
these adaptations amends some features of Aumann’s formulation of the epistemic component
of CKR, and avoids some of the paradoxes associated with that formulation; but neither
attempts to represent the steps of reasoning by which players arrive at the propositions that
they believe to be almost certainly true. Thus, they represent different approaches to the
modelling of CKR from the Lewisian one that we adopt.
3
Since our focus is on differences between the Lewisian approach and core features of
Aumann’s approach, clarity is served by taking his canonical model as our comparator. By
supplementing Aumann’s assumptions about rationality with a principle of caution, and by
adding an assumption about the absence of correlation between the strategies of different
players, we create a specific type of Bayesian model (an ‘ICEU Bayesian model’) which
generates specific versions of the paradoxes of combining caution with Aumann’s conception
of CKR. Later, we use these paradoxes as exhibits and as test cases for our Lewisian
approach. Because the concept of an ICEU Bayesian model is a simple and natural extension
of Aumann’s model, an investigation of the relationship between ICEU Bayesian models and
their common-reasoning analogues sheds light both on the differences between the two
modelling strategies and on the sources of the paradoxes.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents Aumann’s
Bayesian approach to the representation of CKR. Section 3 extends this approach to capture a
conception of practical rationality in which rational individuals maximise expected utility in
relation to beliefs that are independent and cautious, in the sense of Pearce (1984) and
Börgers and Samuelson (1992). We show that this extension has puzzling implications in
some games and generates contradictions in others.
Our Lewisian approach is presented in Sections 4–8. Sections 4–6 introduce
successively its major ingredients. Section 7 defines the class of common-reasoning models
and then establishes the consistency of every such model. Section 8 introduces a sense in
which a given common-reasoning model defines a ‘solution’ to the game, and defines a
3
Lewis’s analysis is sometimes reconstructed in ways that make it more akin to Aumann’s
approach (e.g. Vanderschraaf, 1998; Sillari, 2005; Gintis, 2009; Paternotte, 2011). The
approach we follow here is in line with the view elaborated in Cubitt and Sugden (2003) that
reconstruction of Lewis’s analysis in a framework akin to Aumann’s is liable to edit out much
of the originality of Lewis’s game theory.
6‘recommendation algorithm’ which identifies that solution and which is interpretable as
tracking specific steps of reasoning that lead common reason to it.
As the primitives of our common-reasoning models are very different from those of
the Bayesian models introduced in Section 2, it helps to define a framework within which
they can be compared. We present such a framework in Section 9, exploiting concepts
introduced in Cubitt and Sugden (2011). Section 10 then specialises the common-reasoning
framework to the case where common rationality embodies the conception of practical
rationality that gives rise to paradoxes within the Bayesian approach of Section 2. Using the
framework of Section 9 as a bridge, Section 10 establishes precise relationships between the
corresponding Bayesian and common-reasoning models. These relationships provide the
ingredients for a resolution in Section 11 of the paradoxes presented in Section 3. Section 12
concludes. Between them, two appendices provide proofs of all the formal results.
2. COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF RATIONALITY IN A BAYESIAN MODEL
In this section, we present a Bayesian model of CKR, based on that of Aumann (1987).
We consider the class G of finite, normal-form games of complete information,
interpreted as one-shot games. For any such game, there is a finite set N = {1, ..., n} of
players, with typical element i and n IRUHDFKSOD\HUi, there is a finite, non-empty set of
(pure) strategies Si, with typical element si; and, for each profile of strategies s = (s1, ..., sn),
there is a profile u(s) = (u1[s], …, un[s]) of real-valued and finite utilities. The set S1 u ... u Sn
is denoted S; the set S1 u ... u Si–1 u Si+1 u ... u Sn is denoted S–i and its typical element by s–i.
We impose that, for all distinct i, j,  N, Si  Sj = . This condition has no substantive
significance, but imposes a labelling convention that the strategies available to different
players are distinguished by player indices, if nothing else. This convention allows a
conveniently compact notation in later sections.
Aumann’s modelling strategy is Bayesian in the sense that agents’ beliefs are
described by subjective probabilities, defined on some set of states and updated from initial
priors in the light of known information. Thus, we define a Bayesian model, for any game in
G, so that it specifies all of the following: a set of states of the world; players’ behaviour;
players’ knowledge; players’ subjective beliefs; and a standard of decision-theoretic
rationality.
7Uncertainty is represented by means of a finite, non-empty, universal set : of states,
whose typical element is denoted Z. A set of states is an event.
Players’ behaviour is represented by a behaviour function b(.), which assigns a profile
of strategies b(Z) = (b1[Z], ..., bn[Z]) to each state Z, to be interpreted as the profile of
strategies that are in fact chosen by the players at Z. Stochastic choice (such as mixed
strategies) is represented as choice that is conditioned on random events. For each profile s of
strategies and each strategy si, we define the events E(s) = {Z  : | b(Z) = s} and E(si) = {Z
 : | bi(Z) = si}. Let S* = {s  S | E(s} and Si* = {si  Si | E(si}. S* (respectively
Si*) is the set of strategy profiles (respectively strategies for i) included in the Bayesian
model. Thus, a Bayesian model specifies a binary partition of each player’s strategy set Si,
the elements of which are the set of included strategies Si* and the set of excluded strategies
Si\Si*. By construction, each Si* is non-empty.
Players’ knowledge is represented by an information structure I = (I1, ..., In). For
each player i, Ii is an information partition of :, representing what i knows at each state.
Ki(E), where E is an event, is the event {Z  :| Ec  Ii: (Z  Ec ) and (Ec  E)}.4 If Z 
Ki(E), we say ‘i knows E at Z’. An event E is Bayesian common knowledge at Z if Z is an
element of all events of the finitely-nested form Ki(Kj(... Kk(E)...)). (This is the formal
definition of ‘common knowledge’ used in the model. We use the qualifier ‘Bayesian’ to
distinguish this theoretical construct from the intuitive concept.) Since : is the universal set,
it follows that, for every player i and every state Z, i knows : at Z. Thus, : is Bayesian
common knowledge at every state.
For any player i, a prior is a function Si: :o [0, 1] satisfying the conditions (i) 6Z:
Si(Z) = 1; and (ii) for every event E  Ii, there exists some state Z  E, such that Si(Z) > 0.
Si(Z) is interpreted as a subjective probability. We extend this notation to events by defining,
for each event E, Si(E) = 6ZE Si(Z). Posterior probabilities, conditional on events, are
defined from priors by means of Bayes’s rule. Condition (i) is the obvious condition that
prior probabilities sum to unity; condition (ii) guarantees that posterior probabilities,
conditional on what player i knows at any state, are well-defined. The latter condition is
required if the standard of rationality developed below and drawn from Aumann (1987) is
itself to be well-defined.
4
We use  (resp. ) to denote ‘is a strict (resp. weak) subset of’.
8To represent the normative standard of practical rationality that is to be built into the
model, we define a choiceworthiness function for each player i as a function Fi: :o ~(Si),
where ~(Si) denotes the power set of Si, satisfying two restrictions. First, Fi(Z), the set of
strategies that are choiceworthy for i at Z, is nonempty for all Z. Second, for all E  Ii, for
all Z, Zc  E: Fi(Z) = Fi(Zc). The interpretation is that Fi(Z) is the set of strategies which,
according to the standard of rationality, may be chosen by i at Z. The first restriction
stipulates that, in every state, there is at least one choiceworthy strategy; the second that what
is choiceworthy for a player cannot differ between states that he is unable to distinguish.
In Aumann’s case, the standard of rationality is subjective expected utility
maximisation. Consider any player i. For any s  S, for any sic  Si, let Vi(s, sic) denote the
strategy profile created by substituting sic for si in s (i.e. Vi[s, sic] = [s1, ..., si – 1, sic, si + 1, ...,
sn]). For any prior Si, for any state Zc, for any E  Ii, let Si(Zc|E) denote the posterior
probability of Zc, given E. For each player i, for each state Z, a strategy si is SEU-rational for
i at Z with respect to the information partition Ii and prior Si if, for each strategy sic  Si,
¦ZcE Si(Zc|E) (ui[Vi(b[Zc], si)] – ui[Vi(b[Zc], sic)]) t 0, where E is the event such that Z  E 
Ii. Thus, si is SEU-rational for i at Z if it maximizes expected utility for i, conditional on his
prior beliefs updated by his information at Z.
We define a Bayesian model of a particular game as an ordered quintuple <:, b(.),I,
S, F>, where : is a finite, nonempty set of states and b(Z) = (b1[Z], ..., bn[Z]),I = (I1, ..., In),
S = (S1, ..., Sn) and F = (F1, ..., Fn) are, respectively a behaviour function, an information
structure, a profile of priors and a profile of choiceworthinesss functions defined with respect
to : and the game, such that the following three conditions are satisfied:
Choice Rationality. For all i  N, for all Z  :: bi(Z)  Fi(Z).
SEU-Maximisation. For all i  N, for all Z  :: Fi(Z) = {si  Si| si is SEU-rational at
Z with respect to Ii and Si}.
Knowledge of Own Choice. For all i  N, for all Z  :: Z  Ki[E(bi[Z])].
Choice Rationality requires that, at each state, each player’s actions are consistent with
whatever standard of decision-theoretic rationality is being modelled. SEU-Maximisation
stipulates that the standard of rationality is the maximisation of subjective expected utility.
Knowledge of Own Choice imposes the obvious restriction that, at each state, every player
9knows the pure strategy that he chooses.
5
Our definition of a Bayesian model is equivalent to
that of Aumann (1987), except that we do not impose (or rule out) Aumann’s assumption of
common priors (that is, that for all i, j  N, Si = Sj). Aumann (12–15) notes that, unlike the
other features of his model, it is not essential to a Bayesian representation of CKR; he
imposes it only to generate sharp results.
The following result is implied by the analysis of Aumann (1987):
Theorem 1: For every game in G, a Bayesian model exists.
This theorem shows that, for every game in G, the concept of a Bayesian model is an
internally consistent representation of CKR. In particular, in any such model, : is a universal
set of states at each of which some profile of strategies is played that contains only
choiceworthy strategies; and S* is the set of profiles played at states in :. As : is Bayesian
common knowledge at all states and : = sS* E(s), there is Bayesian common knowledge at
all states of the event that a profile in S* is played.
3. THREE PUZZLES
Given Theorem 1, it is natural to ask whether further conditions can be imposed on Bayesian
models. Our concern is with two restrictions on player’s beliefs. To formulate them, we use
the following concepts: A prior Si for player i is independent if, for each profile s = (s1, ..., sn)
of included strategies, Si(E[s]) = 3jN Si(E[sj]). We extend our notation for posterior
probabilities to those on events by using Si(Ec|E), where Ec  E and E is an element or union
of elements of Ii, to denote player i’s posterior probability of Ec given E. We can now state:
Independence (of Priors). For all i  N: Si is independent.
Caution (of Posteriors). For all distinct i, j  N, for all si Si, for all Z  :: if si
Fi(Z) then Sj(E(si)|E) > 0, where E is the event such that Z  E  Ij.
5
This is consistent with randomisation by players since, as noted above, play of random
strategies is represented in the model by prior uncertainty about which state obtains.
10
Independence rules out the possibility that some player i believes that the choices of
players from among their included strategies are correlated with one another.
6
Although
Aumann’s (1987) Bayesian model of CKR allows correlation of strategies between players,
game theory needs to be able to model situations in which the players have no mechanisms
for achieving such correlation or grounds for believing in it. If the representation of CKR is
to apply to such cases, it must be possible to impose Independence on the model.
Caution requires that, if some strategy si is choiceworthy for player i at state Z then, at
the same state, other players must assign strictly positive posterior probability to si being
played. The motivation for the condition rests on two background assumptions. The first is
the implicit assumption, integral to Aumann’s approach, that each player knows, in an
informal sense, the information partition and prior of each other player (see Aumann 1987: 9–
10). From this, player j should also be taken to know, in the same informal sense, the
choiceworthy strategies for player i at every state Z. The second background assumption is
that the tie-breaking mechanism that player i uses to discriminate between options which,
according to the standard of rationality, are equally choiceworthy is private to him. Since tie-
breaking occurs only when rationality fails to determine what should be chosen, the properties
of a tie-breaking mechanism must be non-rational. If the representation of CKR is to apply to
cases in which non-rational tie-breaking rules are private, it must be possible to impose on the
model the background assumption that they are. To do this would be to require that, if si is
choiceworthy for player i at state Z, then the element of (each other) player j’s information
partition that contains Z must contain some state(s) at which si is played. Given these
background assumptions, Caution expresses the following principle of prudential belief for
each player j z i: If si is choiceworthy for player i at state Z then, given what player j knows at
Z, j’s beliefs should allow that si might be played.
Note that there is no corresponding prudential argument in relation to j’s beliefs about
a strategy si that is not choiceworthy for i, as (by Aumann’s implicit assumption) j is aware of
such non-choiceworthiness. If j knows, in the informal sense, that si is not choiceworthy for i
at any Z, then an Aumann-like understanding of CKR (captured by Choice Rationality and
SEU-Maximisation) should not allow j to assign positive probability to si. By defining the
requirement of Caution relative to choiceworthy strategies, we follow Börgers and Samuelson
6
Note that each player’s prior may be independent whether or not players have a common
prior.
11
(1992) and Pearce (1984).
7
As with Independence, we are not suggesting that Caution is an
implication of Bayesian rationality, but merely that it represents a case of potential interest for
the modelling of CKR.
To be more precise, we interpret Bayesian models which satisfy both Independence
and Caution as attempting to represent common knowledge of the following standard of
practical rationality: each player’s beliefs assign independent probabilities to other players’
strategies, zero probability to strategies regarded as not rationally playable, and strictly
positive probability to all strategies regarded as rationally playable; and each player
maximises expected utility relative to these beliefs. We call this standard that of independent
cautious expected utility maximization (or the ICEU standard, for short).
8
Thus, a Bayesian
model which satisfies Independence and Caution is an ICEU Bayesian model.
It would be puzzling if an otherwise coherent representation of CKR could not
accommodate the view of rationality embedded in the ICEU standard without giving rise to
paradoxes or impossibility. However, that is how matters turn out. We use three games to
illustrate this.
Our first exhibit, illustrating the Proving Too Much Paradox, is Game 1.
9
Game 1:
Player 2
left right
first 0, 0 0, 0
Player 1 second – 1, 3 2, 2
third –1, 3 1, 5
Proposition 1: ICEU Bayesian models of Game 1 exist; and, in every such model,
S1* = {first} and S2* = {left, right}.
7
This approach is distinct from that used by some others in the literature (e.g. Asheim and
Dufwenberg, 2003; Perea, 2011), for whom caution requires that no strategy is regarded as
entirely impossible.
8
The ICEU standard is very closely related to that described in Section 5 of Cubitt and
Sugden (2011), where an independence condition is added to the ‘reasoning-based expected
utility’ conception of practical rationality introduced in Section 3 of that paper. We use a
different name here, to avoid associating the standard itself with any particular approach to
modelling CKR.
9
Game 1 is the normal-form of a simple extensive-form ‘Centipede’ game in which the
initial move belongs to Player 1, the second move to Player 2 and the third and final move to
Player 1. Although Centipede games have most often been discussed in the literature using
the extensive form, our analysis here uses the normal form only.
12
Proposition 1 is paradoxical because S1* = {first} implies that first is choiceworthy at
every state and the only strategy that Player 1 may play. The strategy first can only be
choiceworthy at every state if Player 1’s posterior probability on left is always greater than or
equal to 2/3 (since otherwise second would be strictly better than first). But, at every state,
Player 1 knows that Player 2 is indifferent between left and right. Clearly, player 1 might
believe that there is a tendency for player 2’s tie-breaking mechanism to resolve in favour of
left even when, as in the situations that ICEU Bayesian models are intended to represent, that
mechanism is private. The puzzling feature of Proposition 1 is that it implies that, even when
the tie-breaker is private, Player 1 must believe it to have that tendency. In this sense, we
seem to have proved too much.
In more general terms, the Proving Too Much Paradox takes the following form. The
property that some specific strategy is (or is not) choiceworthy holds for all ICEU Bayesian
models, with the apparent implication that common knowledge of this property is implied
merely by the assumption that the ICEU standard of rationality is common knowledge; but
there seems to be no way that the players could arrive at that conclusion, using only the
reasoning resources attributed to them by that assumption.
10
Our second exhibit illustrates another way in which a Bayesian modelling approach
can seem to generate paradoxical implications. This game is named in memory of a method
of marking lanes on single-carriageway roads which was once common in Britain. There
were three lanes, one for slow traffic in each direction, and a central lane designated for
overtaking in both directions. The players are drivers travelling in opposite directions who
have simultaneous overtaking opportunities; each is indifferent between staying in his slow
lane and overtaking successfully. Each player i chooses whether to pull out to overtake (outi)
or not to do so (ini):
10
It might be objected that ‘proving too much’ in a model of CKR is a contradiction in terms,
as an ideally rational player would be able to reproduce any proof of a property of the model.
In the current context, the objection would take the form that, if the players have the
reasoning resources attributed to them by the assumption that the ICEU standard of rationality
is common knowledge, they can work out that first is the unique choiceworthy strategy for
Player 1 in Game 1 by reproducing our proof of Proposition 1. This objection rests on a
misunderstanding. Even supposing players can reconstruct the proof of Proposition 1, (a
supposition which, though coherent, goes beyond what can be represented in a Bayesian
model), all they could thereby conclude is Proposition 1 itself, i.e. a claim about ICEU
Bayesian models, not about Player 2’s tie-breaker.
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Game 2: (Three-lane Road)
Player 2
in2 out2
Player 1 in1 1, 1 1, 1
out1 1, 1 0, 0
Proposition 2: ICEU Bayesian models of Game 2 exist; and, in every such model,
either (i) S1* = {in1} and S2* = {in2, out2} or (ii) S1* = {in1, out1} and S2* = {in2}.
Proposition 2 implies that, in every ICEU Bayesian model of Game 2, one of the two
players plays the ‘risky’ strategy (out) in some states, while the other plays it in none. The
structure of the game is entirely symmetrical with respect to the two players. But, if one
player plays out in some states and the other plays it in none, there must be some asymmetry
that tells one and only one player that they may play out. The apparent implication of
Proposition 2 is that the existence of such an asymmetry is implied merely by the assumption
that the ICEU standard of rationality is common knowledge; but there seems to be no way in
which the players could discover that asymmetry using only the knowledge attributed to them
by that assumption, since both the assumption and the game are symmetric. Of course, there
is no paradox in the idea that there could be common knowledge of an asymmetry in what
rationality requires of the players, grounded on information external to the formal description
of the game. The Three-lane Road Paradox is the apparent demonstration that a conception
of CKR implies that there must be such knowledge.
Neither Game 1 nor Game 2 yields an outright inconsistency in the conditions that
define an ICEU Bayesian model. In fact, these conditions are mutually consistent for every
two-player game in G.
11
However, an inconsistency can be shown using a game introduced
by Cubitt and Sugden (1994), which can be thought of as a three-player extension of Game
2.
12
We call the inconsistency shown by this game the Tom, Dick and Harry Paradox to
11
This can be proved by exploiting the existence proof for quasi-strict Nash equilibrium for
two-player games due to Norde (1999). Given a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium of a game, a
Bayesian model of that game can be constructed, using the technique in our proof of Theorem
1. The properties of quasi-strict Nash equilibrium ensure that Independence and Caution are
satisfied.
12
The reader may wonder why a three-player example is needed, as we motivated our
Caution condition with reference to the conception used by Börgers and Samuelson (1992) in
defining their “consistent pairs”. Börgers and Samuelson present a 2-player game with no
consistent pair. Though related, the concept of a consistent pair is not identical to that of an
ICEU Bayesian model even for a 2-player game. ICEU Bayesian models do exist for Börgers
and Samuelson’s example. For detail on the relationship between Cubitt and Sugden (1994)
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match the story described in that paper. Tom (player 1), Dick (player 2) and Harry (player 3)
are guests in an isolated hotel. Tom is trying to avoid Dick, Dick to avoid Harry, and Harry to
avoid Tom; yet, there is no alternative to taking their evening meal in the hotel. Guests who
eat in the restaurant (out) will meet each other, whereas those who eat in their rooms (in) will
not meet any others.
Game 3 (Tom, Dick and Harry)
Player 3: in3
Player 2
in2 out2
Player 1 in1 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
out1 1, 1, 1 0, 1, 1
Player 3: out3
Player 2
in2 out2
Player 1 in1 1, 1, 1 1, 0, 1
out1 1, 1, 0 0, 0, 0
The paradox consists in the fact that there is no ICEU Bayesian model of Game 3,
which constitutes a proof of the following result:
Theorem 2: There are games in G for which no ICEU Bayesian model exists.
Theorem 2 establishes that there is at least one standard of rationality, namely ICEU,
that cannot be represented without contradiction in a Bayesian model. However, we also
know from Theorem 1 that there is at least one standard, namely SEU-maximisation, that can
be so represented. So should one simply conclude that the Bayesian modelling strategy has
been vindicated and that ICEU is unacceptable? We think not.
Considered in its own right (rather than in the context of Bayesian modelling), the
view of rationality embedded in ICEU seems to be internally coherent. The normative issue
of adjudicating between alternative standards of rationality seems orthogonal to the modelling
issue of how to represent a world in which some standard of rationality is common
knowledge. Thus, whether or not one believes that obeying the ICEU standard is a normative
and Börgers and Samuelson (1992), see the expanded version of the former that appeared as
Cubitt and Sugden (1997), and Squires (1998).
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requirement of rationality, it is puzzling that common knowledge of that standard cannot
always be represented in a Bayesian model. Of course, it is open to a game theorist to treat
the Bayesian modelling strategy as a fixed point, and to stipulate that the only relevant
standards of rationality are those that can be represented in such models. But that would
leave unanswered the theoretical question of why the Bayesian approach cannot represent
common knowledge of an apparently coherent standard of rationality. And in the absence of
a satisfactory answer to that question, privileging that approach seems an arbitrary
manoeuvre, and all the more so if common knowledge of the ICEU standard can be
represented by a different approach.
4. REASONING SCHEMES
We now develop our Lewisian rendition of CKR in which players’ reasoning is represented
explicitly. Such representation requires different primitives. As a first step, we introduce our
representation of a mode of reasoning.
We model a mode of reasoning as a structure defined in relation to some domain P of
sentences, to be interpreted as well-formed formulae of a formal language. Implicitly, these
sentences express propositions which may either be taken as given or inferred within a given
mode of reasoning. We use p, q, r as sentence variables, that is as placeholders for
unspecified sentences in P. In this Section, we impose only very general conditions on P.
The logical connectives ¬, , and, defined by the rules of classical logic are used,
respectively, for negation, conjunction and material implication. We impose throughout that
P is closed under the formation of negation, conjunction and material implication, i.e. that if
p, q  P then ¬p, p  q, p q  P.
An inference rule in domain P is a two-place instruction of the form «from ..., infer ...
», where the first place is filled by a non-empty, finite subset of P (whose elements are the
premises of the rule) and the second place by an element of P (the conclusion of the rule).
An inference structure is a triple R = <P, A(R), I(R)>, where P is the domain in which
reasoning takes place, A(R)  P is the set of axioms of R, and I(R) is a set of inference rules
in domain P. The set T(R) of theorems of R is defined inductively as follows. We define
T0(R) = A(R). For kTk(R) is defined as Tk–1(R)  {p  P» p is the conclusion of an
inference rule in I(R), all of whose premises are in Tk–1(R)}. Then T(R) = T0(R)  T1(R)  ... .
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Below, we will use a particular class of inference structures called ‘reasoning
schemes’ to represent modes of reasoning that are accessible to the players of a game. The
game-theoretic content of a reasoning scheme R will be represented by properties of P, A(R)
and I(R). P will be defined in terms of a particular formal language, in which sentences refer
to properties of strategies in a game; and principles of game-theoretic reasoning will be
represented as axioms and inference rules of R. Thus, we will include inference rules which
represent such principles, but are not licensed by classical logic – for example, rules which
infer what it would be rational for one player to do from a prediction about what another
player will do. Our main interest is in the implications for players’ reasoning of specific
game-theoretic axioms and inference rules. But since we are modelling rationality, it is
incumbent on us also to endow players with the capability to make inferences that are
licensed by classical logic. As a means of achieving this, we proceed as follows.
Throughout our analysis, we will use the term ‘logically’ only to refer to operations
licensed by classical logic. Thus, we will say, for any non-empty, finite subset Q = {q1, ...,
qm} of P and any p  P, that p is logically entailed by Q if q1  ...  qm  ¬p is a
contradiction in classical logic (i.e. if every truth-value assignment renders it false); and that
an inference rule is logically valid if its conclusion is logically entailed (in this sense) by the
set of its premises. For any inference structure R, we will say that I(R) contains the rules of
valid inference if, for every non-empty, finite Q  P and every p  P, if p is logically entailed
by Q then «from Q, infer p»  I(R). We will say that a set of sentences is consistent if it has
no finite subset the conjunction of all elements of which is a contradiction in classical logic.
An inference structure R, such that A(R) is non-empty and I(R) contains the rules of
valid inference, is a reasoning scheme. Thus, for every reasoning scheme R, every tautology
in P is an element of T(R). We will say that a reasoning scheme R is consistent if T(R) is
consistent. Our aim is to model CKR in terms of reasoning schemes that are consistent. But,
to demonstrate the feasibility of this goal, we need to use a modelling framework in which
consistency can be proved. For this reason, we do not impose consistency as part of the
definition of a reasoning scheme.
We will say that a person endorses a reasoning scheme R if he takes its axioms to be
true and accepts the authority of its inference rules; a person who endorses R has reason to
believe each of its theorems. Our analysis will be about what players have reason to believe
about one another’s strategy choices, given that they endorse particular kinds of reasoning
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schemes. Because we take this approach, we will never need to consider whether the
theorems of some reasoning scheme are ‘really’ true or false.
5. COMMON REASONING IN A POPULATION
Our approach is to model CKR among a population of agents as the existence of a core of
shared reasoning which is endorsed by each agent in the population and is commonly
attributed to other such agents. It allows us to represent the idea that each individual
maintains a distinction between (on the one hand) what everyone has reason to believe, given
the axioms and inference rules that everyone endorses and (on the other hand) what he has
reason to believe, given the axioms and inference rules that he endorses. Thus, given a finite,
non-empty, population N = {1, …, n} of agents, we postulate the existence, for each agent i,
of a reasoning scheme Ri of private reason which i endorses, and the existence of a reasoning
scheme R* of common reason. Of each sentence p that is a theorem of R*, we will say that
there is common reason to believe p.
As a step in defining the formal language of our models, we introduce the following
piece of syntax. If p is a sentence and R is a reasoning scheme, R(p) is a sentence to be read
as ‘p is a theorem of R’. Note that R(p) is a sentence that can feature as an axiom or theorem
of a reasoning scheme; it is not how we will express a statement, made from our viewpoint as
modellers, about the properties of R. When we assert that p is a theorem of R, we use the
notation p  T(R). Thus, for example, if R1 and R2 are (possibly distinct) reasoning schemes,
R2(p)  T(R1) denotes that the sentence R2(p), which expresses the proposition that p is a
theorem of R2, is in fact a theorem of R1.
We take as given a non-empty set P0 of primitive sentences, such that no sentence in
P0 contains any of the terms R*(.), R1(.),..., Rn(.). For each k t 1, we define Pk to contain all
of the following sentences (and no others): (i) every sentence which can be constructed from
the elements of Pk–1 using a finite number of connectives from the set {¬, ,}, (ii) every
sentence of the form R*(p) where p  Pk–1; and (iii) every sentence of the form Ri(p) where i
 {1, ..., n} and p  Pk–1. We define M(P0) { P0  P1 ... . For any given specification of P0,
M(P0) is the domain in which the reasoning schemes of our model operate.
We now define the following concept as a representation of the links between private
and common reason. An interactive reasoning system among the population N = {1, …, n} is
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a triple < P0, R*, (R1, …, Rn)>, where P0 is a set of primitive sentences, R* is a reasoning
scheme, and (R1, ..., Rn) is a profile of reasoning schemes, such that each of the (n+1)
reasoning schemes has the domain M(P0) and the following conditions hold:
Awareness: For all i  N, for all p  M(P0): if p  T(R*) then R*(p)  A(Ri).
Authority: For all i  N, for all p  M(P0): «from {R*(p)}, infer p»  I(Ri).
Attribution (of Common Reason): For all i  N, for all p  M(P0): «from {p}, infer
Ri(p)»  I(R*).
We will say that an interactive reasoning system <P0, R*, (R1, ..., Rn)> is consistent if each of
its component reasoning schemes is consistent.
The Awareness condition stipulates that each agent’s private reasoning has access to
the theorems of common reason. The Authority condition stipulates that, from the premise
that some sentence p is a theorem of common reason, each agent’s private reason infers p.
The Attribution condition stipulates that common reason attributes its own theorems to the
private reason of each agent. Awareness and Authority together imply that each theorem of
common reason is also a theorem of the private reason of each agent i. Thus, we may think of
common reason, not as involving any unexplained collective consciousness, but simply as a
sub-routine that each agent can individually use to generate certain theorems. It is convenient
to identify this sub-routine using the device of R*, and then to impose Attribution upon it, in
order to capture the idea that certain conclusions are reached by all agents in the population in
the same way and also attributed by each of them to each other.
We will say that there is iterated reason to believe p in population N if the proposition
Rj(... Rk(p)...)  T(Ri) is true, for all finitely nested sentences Rj(... Rk(p)...) and all i, j, ..., k 
N. The following theorem establishes that, in an interactive reasoning system, there is iterated
reason to believe all sentences that are theorems of R*:
Theorem 3: Consider any population N of agents and any interactive reasoning
system <P0, R*, (R1, …, Rn)> among the population N. For every sentence p  T(R*),
there is iterated reason to believe p in population N.
Iterated reason to believe is the closest Lewisian analogue of Aumann’s concept of common
knowledge. Theorem 3 allows our analysis of CKR to be carried out almost entirely in terms
of R*. Nevertheless, private reasoning schemes are an essential part of our modelling
strategy, since it is only by virtue of the connections between private and common reason that
we can claim that an analysis of R* is informative about iterated reason to believe.
19
There is a close affinity between Theorem 3 and Lewis’s (1969: 52–60) analysis of
common knowledge. Lewis defines p to be ‘common knowledge’ in a population N if some
‘state of affairs’ A holds, such that (i) everyone in N has reason to believe that A holds, (ii) A
‘indicates’ to everyone in N that everyone in N has reason to believe that A holds, and (iii) A
‘indicates’ to everyone in N that p. He defines ‘A indicates to person i that p’ as ‘if i has
reason to believe that A holds, i thereby has reason to believe that p’. He sketches a proof of
the theorem that if p is common knowledge in this sense, and given (not fully specified)
premises to the effect that individuals share, and have reason to believe that they share, certain
principles of rationality, inductive standards and background information, there is iterated
reason to believe p in N. Cubitt and Sugden (2003) reconstruct the theorem and its proof,
using an explicit specification of the properties of ‘indication’, motivated by interpreting ‘i
has reason to believe that p’ as saying that p is treated as true in a mode of reasoning that i
endorses and ‘A indicates to i that p’ as saying that, in that mode of reasoning, there is an
inference from ‘A holds’ to p.
The same ideas can be represented more directly in an interactive reasoning system, in
which ‘shared’ background information and principles of rationality are represented by
axioms and inference rules of R*. For this purpose, we treat p and ‘A holds’ as sentences in
the formal language of that interactive reasoning system. That some state of affairs A is such
that, if it occurs, its occurrence is public and self-evident can be represented by the material
implication that if (in fact) A holds, then ‘A holds’  A(R*). That there are common
standards of inductive inference such that, if there is common reason to believe that A holds,
there is thereby common reason to believe p can be represented by «from {‘A holds’}, infer
p»  I(R*). Given these conditions, it follows from Theorem 3 that if (in fact) A holds, then
there is iterated reason to believe p in N.
Our method of modelling CKR in a given game will be to represent practical and
game-theoretic rationality in terms of axioms and inference rules, and to attribute these to
common reason in an interactive reasoning system among the population comprising the
players of the game. By virtue of Theorem 3, any sentences that can be derived using those
axioms and inference rules will be the object of iterated reason to believe among the players.
6. DECISION RULES: PRACTICAL RATIONALITY EXPRESSED BY SENTENCES
In this section, we develop a general method of representing principles of practical rationality
for a game in the form of a particular kind of sentence, which we call a ‘decision rule’. This
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concept uses a purely formal notion of ‘permissibility’, to be interpreted as permissibility
with respect to whatever principles of practical rationality are to be represented.
Here, and throughout Sections 6–9, we fix a given game in G. Our analysis applies to
any such game but we suppress phrases of the form ‘for all games in G’ except in formal
results. Differences between games become important again only in Sections 10 and 11.
We now add two further pieces of syntax to our formal language. For every player i
and for every si Si, pi(si) is a sentence to be read as ‘si is permissible for i’ and interpreted
as stating that, normatively, i may choose si (but not that he must, since two or more
strategies might be permissible for him). For every player i and for every si Si, mi(si) is a
sentence to be read as ‘si is possible for i’ and interpreted as stating that si might in fact be
chosen by i. Sentences of the form pi(si) or ¬pi(si) (the latter read as ‘si is impermissible for
i’) are permissibility sentences. For each permissibility sentence pi(si) or ¬pi(si), the
corresponding possibility sentence mi(si) or ¬mi(si) (the latter read as ‘si is impossible for i’)
is its correlate, and vice versa.
We will say of any conjunction of sentences that it states each of its conjuncts. A
prediction about a player i is a conjunction of the elements of a consistent set of possibility
sentences referring to the strategies available to i, satisfying the conditions that (i) not every
strategy in Si is stated to be impossible; and (ii) that, if every strategy but one in Si is stated to
be impossible, the remaining strategy is stated to be possible. Notice that (ii) is not redundant
because, in general, a prediction about i may not refer to every strategy available to i. (Since
we want to be able to represent how reasoning can proceed in successive steps from initial
premises to progressively richer conclusions, we need to be able to represent predictions that
are incomplete in this sense.) Conditions (i) and (ii) express the presumption that, as Si
exhausts the options available to i, it cannot be the case that all its elements are impossible;
and, if every element but one is impossible, that establishes that the remaining one is possible
(indeed, certain). A conjunction of the elements of a non-empty set of predictions about
individual players other than i, where that set contains no more than one non-null prediction
about any such player, is a collective prediction about N\{i}.
Analogously with the concept of prediction, a recommendation to a player i is a
conjunction of the elements of a consistent set of permissibility sentences referring to the
strategies available to i, satisfying analogues of conditions (i) and (ii); here the presumption
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that those conditions embody is that normative requirements must be logically capable of
being satisfied.
The definition of a correlate is extended to recommendations and predictions, so that
for each recommendation there is a unique correlate prediction and vice versa: the correlate
of a recommendation (resp. prediction) is the conjunction of the correlates of its component
permissibility (resp. possibility) sentences.
13
We also need to represent sentences that assert nothing substantive about what player i
might or might not play or, correspondingly, about what would or would not be normatively
permissible for i. Sentences of the first kind play a crucial initiation role in our model of
reasoning as, intuitively put, we need to represent how a player ‘starts’ with no substantive
conclusions about what another player may or may not play and only ‘reaches’ such
conclusions though steps of reasoning. We therefore define a further piece of syntax. We
use an arbitrary tautology, denoted by #, to represent a sentence with no content – the null
sentence. Thus, # can be a null recommendation, a null prediction, or null collective
prediction. In view of this, the correlate of # is #.
Recommendations to a player i, collective predictions about the set of players N\{i},
and predictions about i are sentences that have special roles to play in what follows. To
distinguish them from other sentences, we use the sentence variables yi for recommendations
to i, x–i for collective predictions about N\{i}, and zi for predictions about i. Using this
notation, a maxim for player i is a material implication x–i  yi. The interpretation is that,
conditional on the prediction x–i about the behaviour of players other than i, the permissibility
sentences stated by yi are mandated by some conception of practical rationality. Note that the
maxim # yi is logically equivalent to the recommendation yi.
A decision rule for player i is a conjunction of all elements of a set Fi of maxims for i,
such that Fi satisfies the following conditions: (i) (Distinct Antecedents) for all x–i: Fi contains
at most one maxim whose antecedent is logically equivalent to x–i; and (ii) (Deductive
Closure) for all x–ic, for all non-null yic: if the material implication x–ic  yic is logically
entailed by a conjunction of all elements of Fi, then Fi contains a maxim x–is  yis such that
x–is is logically equivalent to x–ic and yis logically entails yic. By virtue of Distinct
13
As part of the definition of the correlate of a recommendation (resp: prediction), we require
that the order of the component possibility (resp: permissibility) sentences in the correlate
matches that of the component permissibility (resp: possibility) sentences in the
recommendation (resp: prediction).
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Antecedents, a decision rule for i makes a set of recommendations to her that are conditional
on logically distinct predictions about the other players. In view of this, the Deductive
Closure condition implies that, for any collective prediction, all the permissibility sentences
implied by the rule, given that prediction, are summarised by a single maxim of the rule. As
the consequent of that maxim is a recommendation, this condition guarantees that the set Fi is
consistent, and that Fi does not logically entail the falsity of any collective prediction. In this
sense, a decision rule for player i is compatible with every possible collective prediction
about the other players. However, it need not contain maxims covering all these possibilities.
We use Di as a sentence variable standing in for a decision rule for player i.
7. COMMON PRACTICAL REASONING IN A GAME
We now use the concepts of an interactive reasoning system and of a decision rule, developed
in Sections 5 and 6 respectively, to model CKR in a given game. To do so, we first specify
P0, the set of primitive sentences, so that it contains # and, for each i  N and for each si  Si,
the sentences mi(si) and pi(si) (and no other sentences). This specification implies that all
decision rules are in M(P0). Next, we specify a particular profile of decision rules D = (D1, ...,
Dn). We then construct reasoning schemes R* = <M(P0), A(R*), I(R*)>, R1 = <M(P0), A(R1),
I(R1)>, ... , Rn = <M(P0), A(Rn), I(Rn)> in the following way. R* is constructed by using the
rules:
(1) A(R*) = {#, D1, ..., Dn};
(2) I(R*) contains the rules of valid inference and those specified below, and no
other rules:
(i) for all p  M(P0): «from {p}, infer Ri(p)»  I(R*);
(ii) for all i  N, for all yi, zi  M(P0) such that yi is a recommendation to i and
zi is the prediction about i that is the correlate of yi: «from {Ri(yi)}, infer zi» 
I(R*).
For each i  N, Ri is constructed by using the rules:
(3) A(Ri) = {p  M(P0) «p = R*(q) for some q  T(R*)};
(4) I(Ri) contains the rules of valid inference and those specified below, and no
other rules:
for all p  M(P0): «from {R*(p)}, infer p»  I(Ri).
By virtue of rules (2i), (3) and (4), which respectively ensure that the Attribution,
Awareness and Authority requirements are satisfied, < P0, R*, (R1, …, Rn)> is an interactive
23
reasoning system.
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Rule (1) provides R* with substantive axioms, in the form of the decision
rules in D. Rule (2ii) provides R* with an inference rule that is specific to our modelling of
game-theoretic rationality. This inference rule embeds in common reason the following
principle: from i’s having reason to believe some recommendation that applies to him, it can
be inferred that he will act on that recommendation. In this sense, common reason attributes
practical rationality to each player.
An interactive reasoning system <P0, R*, (R1, …, Rn)> defined in relation to a profile
D of decision rules and constructed according to rules (1) to (4), with P0 as specified at the
start of this Section, is a common-reasoning model of the game; D is its common standard of
practical rationality.
It is immediate that, for any profile D of decision rules for any game in G, a
corresponding (and unique) common-reasoning model exists: the model is constructed by
defining P0 as specified and following rules (1) to (4). What is not so obvious (since rules (1)
to (4) attribute substantive axioms, as well as some inference rules besides those of logically
valid inference, to the component reasoning schemes) is whether the model so constructed is
consistent. The following theorem establishes this property:
Theorem 4: For every game in G, for every profile D of decision rules for that game,
the common-reasoning model in which D is the common standard of practical
rationality is consistent.
Theorem 4 shows that our framework can represent coherently common knowledge of any
conception of practical rationality that can be formulated as a profile of decision rules.
Together with Theorem 3, it establishes the credentials of our Lewisian modelling approach.
8. THE RECOMMENDATION ALGORITHM
We now focus on the content of common reason in the common-reasoning model defined by
a given profile D of decision rules, in so far as that content relates to permissibility and
impermissibility of strategies. (From rules (3) and (4) and Theorem 4, each Ri will have the
same content as common reason in relation to permissibility and impermissibility of
strategies.)
14 Note that rules (3) and (4) imply that, for all players i and j, A(Ri ) = A(Rj) and I(Ri ) = I(Rj).
Though this feature could be relaxed in more complex models, it is helpful to impose it here.
Notwithstanding this, it is still important for our Lewisian perspective that Ri and Rj are
distinct objects, for reasons made clear by Theorem 3.
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For each player i and each strategy si, we can ask whether, in the common-reasoning
model, it is a theorem of R* that si is permissible for i (i.e. whether pi(si)  T(R*) is true). We
can also ask whether it is such a theorem that si is impermissible for i (i.e. whether [¬pi(si)] 
T(R*) is true). By virtue of Theorem 4, it cannot be the case that pi(si)  T(R*) and [¬pi(si)]
T(R*) are both true. But it can be the case that neither is true – that is, that common reason is
silent about whether si is permissible or impermissible. Thus, in general, a common-
reasoning model implies a trinary partition of each player’s strategy set Si, the three elements
of which are {si  Si| pi(si)  T(R*)}, {si  Si| [¬pi(si)]  T(R*)}, and {si  Si| pi(si)  T(R*)
and [¬pi(si)]  T(R*)}. We call this partition the common-reasoning partition for player i.
These arguments indicate that the common-reasoning model, for a given profile of
decision rules, defines a ‘solution’ of the game that is interpretable as indicating which
strategies are shown by common reason to be permissible (resp. impermissible).
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In general,
a solution may have the property that some si is neither shown by common reason to be
permissible nor shown by common reason to be impermissible. The reader might want to ask
what, in such a case, it is rational for the relevant player i to do. However, the Lewisian
approach does not analyse what it is ‘really’ rational for a player to do, but rather what players
have reason to believe, given that they endorse certain modes of reasoning. Within this
approach, the closest analogue of the reader’s question is ‘Which permissibility sentences
does i have reason to believe to be true?’ The answer (in view of rules (3) and (4) for the
construction of Ri in the common-reasoning model) is: ‘The set of permissibility sentences
that are theorems of R*’. All that can be said (for the relevant case) is that, using only the
reasoning resources that have been attributed to her by the model, i cannot determine whether
si is permissible or impermissible.
Although Theorem 4 establishes the existence of a solution, it does not in itself show
how we, as analysts, can discover that solution; nor does it indicate a specific line of
reasoning whereby common reason can reach the conclusions about permissibility (resp.
impermissibility) of strategies that are summarised by the profile of common-reasoning
partitions. Each of these gaps can be filled by defining a particular algorithm, as we now
explain.
15
A corresponding argument can be made about possibility and impossibility, leading to the
conclusion that each Si can be partitioned into {si  Si| mi(si)  T(R*)}, {si  Si| [¬mi(si)] 
T(R*)}, and {si  Si| mi(si)  T(R*) and [¬mi(si)]  T(R*)}. It is an implication of our proofs
in the appendices that, for each player i, this partition coincides with the common-reasoning
partition.
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For any profile D = (D1, ..., Dn) of decision rules, we define the recommendation
algorithm as follows. The algorithm has a succession of stages k = 0, 1, 2, ..., at each of
which, for each player i, it generates as its output a recommendation to i, denoted yi
k
. As an
initiation rule, we set yi
0
= #, for each i. Then, for each stage k > 0, and for each player i, yi
k
is
obtained through three operations. Operation 1 generates, for each i, a prediction about i,
denoted zi
k
, that is defined as the correlate of yi
k–1
. Operation 2 generates, for each i, a
collective prediction about N\{i}, denoted x–i
k
, that is defined as z1
k  ...  zi – 1k  z i + 1k  ... 
zn
k
. Operation 3 determines yi
k
, for each i, as follows: if there is a component maxim of Di
that has as its antecedent a sentence logically equivalent to x–i
k
, then yi
k
is the consequent of
that maxim; otherwise, yi
k
= #. The algorithm halts if a stage k* is reached at which yi
k*
=
yi
k*–1
, for all i. If such a k* is reached, then, for each player i, yi
k*
is the final output of the
algorithm. We can now state:
Theorem 5: Consider any game in G and any profile D of decision rules for the game.
(i) The recommendation algorithm for D halts at some finite stage k* > 0.
(ii) For each player i, let yi
k*
be the final output of the recommendation algorithm for
D, and R* be common reason in the common-reasoning model with D as common
standard of practical rationality. For each i  N, and for each si  Si:
(a) si is stated by yi
k*
to be permissible if, and only if, pi(si)  T(R*); and
(b) si is stated by yi
k*
to be impermissible if, and only if, [¬pi(si)]  T(R*).
This theorem establishes that, for any profile D of decision rules, the corresponding
recommendation algorithm halts and generates, as its final output for each player i, a
recommendation for i that conjoins exactly those permissibility sentences for i that are
theorems of R* in the common-reasoning model with D as common standard of practical
rationality. Thus, the algorithm is a tool by which we, as analysts, can discover the common-
reasoning partition for each player i.
The recommendation algorithm can also be interpreted as tracking a line of reasoning
by which common reason can establish the conclusions captured by the players’ common-
reasoning partitions. To see this, consider the algorithm for any given profile D of decision
rules. With respect to each player i, the output of stage 0 (i.e. the null recommendation) is an
axiom of, and therefore a theorem of, R* in the corresponding common-reasoning model, by
virtue of rule (1) for construction of that model. The output of each subsequent stage can be
derived by using, in a specific sequence, axioms and inference rules of R* together with the
output of the previous stage. At each stage, Operation 1 tracks inferences from the output of
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the previous stage that are licensed by rules in I(R*) by virtue of rules (2i) and (2ii) for the
construction of a common-reasoning model; Operation 2 tracks inferences from the
conclusions of those tracked by Operation 1 that are licensed by rules of logically valid
inference in I(R*), by virtue of rule (2); and, finally, Operation 3 tracks inferences licensed by
rules of logically valid inference provided by rule (2), using as premises D, which is an
axiom of R* by virtue of rule 1, and the conclusions of inferences tracked by Operation 2.
9. CATEGORISATIONS
In Section 10 below, we compare our Lewisian common-reasoning approach with the
Bayesian approach described in Sections 2 and 3. But first we define some concepts
introduced by Cubitt and Sugden (2011) that are useful in making the comparison, because
they provide a convenient way to summarise binary and trinary partitions of sets of strategies.
For any player i, an ordered pair <Si
+
, Si
–
> of subsets of Si is a categorisation of Si if it
satisfies the following conditions: (i) Si
+
and Si
–
are disjoint; (ii) Si
–  Si; and (iii) if Si\Si– =
{si} for any si Si, then Si+ = {si}. In general, a categorisation of Si defines a trinary partition
of Si, whose elements are the positive component Si
+
, the negative component Si
–
, and the
residual set Si\(Si
+ Si–).
Now consider any non-empty set Nc  N of players. For each i  Nc, let <Si+, Si–> be
any categorisation of Si. In order to allow us to aggregate across players, we define a ‘union’
relation * between such categorisations such that *iNc <Si+, Si–> { < iNc Si+,  iNc Si–>.16
Each such * iNc <Si+, Si–> is a categorisation of  iNc Si; its positive component is  iNc Si+;
and its negative component is  iNc Si–. For purposes of the main text, we need only the case
where Nc = N. For this case, we use a shorthand notation in which  denotes iN Si and  +
and  – denote, respectively, the positive and negative components of a typical categorisation
of  . Such a categorisation is exhaustive if  +   – =  .
Consider any two categorisations C c = < +c,  –c> and C s = < +s,  –s> of  . We
define a binary relation * (read as has weakly more content than) between such
categorisations such that C s * C c if and only if  +s   +c and  –s   –c. If, in addition,
either  +s   +c or  –s  –c holds, we will say that C s has strictly more content than C c,
denoted C s * C c.
16
Recall that we have imposed that that, for all i, j,  N, Si  Sj =.
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Consider any Bayesian model M of the game, as defined in Section 2. For each player
i, the model specifies a set Si*(M)  Si of included strategies. Equivalently, for each i, M
specifies a categorisation Ci
M
= <Si
+
(M), Si
–
(M)> of Si, where Si
+
(M) = Si*(M) and Si
–
(M) =
Si\Si*(M).
17
Thus, aggregating across all players, M specifies a single categorisation C
M
=
*iN <Si+(M), Si–(M)> of  . We will say that CM is the inclusion categorisation with respect
to Bayesian model M. By construction, C
M
is exhaustive.
Now consider the common-reasoning model of the game, for a given profile D of
decision rules, as defined in Section 7. As Section 8 showed, for any player i, this model
defines a trinary common-reasoning partition of Si, two of whose elements are {si  Si| pi(si)
 T(R*)} and {si  Si| [¬pi(si)]  T(R*)}, where R* is common reason. Thus, the model
defines, for each i, a categorisation <Si
+
(D), Si
–
(D)> of Si, where Si
+
(D)= {si  Si| pi(si) 
T(R*)} and Si
–
(D) = {si  Si| [¬pi(si)]  T(R*)}.18 Again aggregating across players, the
common-reasoning model for the profile D specifies a single categorisation C
D
= *iN <
Si
+
(D), Si
–
(D)> of  . Unlike CM, CD may or may not be exhaustive, depending on the
common-reasoning partitions resulting from profile D. As the positive (resp. negative)
component of C
D
is the set of strategies whose permissibility (resp. impermissibility) is
established in common reason in the common-reasoning model, we will say that C
D
is the
common-reasoning solution of the game, with respect to the profile D of decision rules.
10. ICEU BAYESIAN MODELS REVISITED
In this Section, we compare our approach to modelling CKR, set out in Sections 4–8, to the
canonical approach set out in Sections 2 and 3. We focus on the cases in which each
approach is adapted to a conception of practical rationality provided by the ICEU standard.
We have already defined the concept of a Bayesian model which incorporates the
ICEU standard – the ICEU Bayesian model. To explore the relationship between the two
approaches, we need to specify a corresponding class of common-reasoning models in which
the conception of practical rationality is ICEU. As explained in Section 7, the common-
17
Given our definitions here and in Section 2, non-emptiness of : ensures that CiM satisfies
the definition of a categorisation.
18
Since the common-reasoning partition for player i is a partition of Si, condition (i) of the
definition of a categorisation is satisfied. That conditions (ii) and (iii) are satisfied too follows
from the facts that decision rules are defined in terms of predictions and recommendations,
and conditions analogous with (ii) and (iii) are embedded in the definitions of ‘prediction’ and
‘recommendation’.
28
reasoning model is uniquely defined for any given game and any given profile of decision
rules. So what we need to do is to define a profile of ICEU decision rules, for any given
game. We do this in the following way.
For any player i and for any collective prediction x–i about N\{i}, we define a
probability distribution over S–i as ICEU-consistent with x–i if it satisfies the following
conditions. First, probabilities are independent in that, for each s–i  S–i, the probability of s–i
is the product of the marginal probabilities of the strategies appearing in s–i. Second, every
strategy that x–i states to be impossible has zero marginal probability. Third, every strategy
that x–i states to be possible has strictly positive marginal probability. An ICEU maxim for i is
a maxim x–i  yi such that (i) yi states pi(si) if, and only if, si maximises i’s expected utility
relative to all probability distributions that are ICEU-consistent with x–i, and (ii) yi states
¬pi(si) if, and only if, si does not maximise i’s expected utility relative to any probability
distribution that is ICEU-consistent with x–i. Because the elements of a given set of sentences
can be conjoined in different orders, there may be collective predictions (resp.
recommendations) that are formally distinct from, but logically equivalent to x–i (resp. yi), and
so there may be more than one ICEU maxim with the logical content of x–i  yi. By taking
exactly one maxim from every set of logically equivalent ICEU maxims for i, we can
construct a non-redundant set Fi of ICEU maxims for each player i.
Consider any two ICEU maxims x–ic  yic and x–is  yis. It follows from the
definition of an ICEU maxim that if x–ic and x–is are logically equivalent then so too are yic and
yis. Hence, given the definition of non-redundancy, Fi satisfies Distinct Antecedents. It also
follows from the definition of an ICEU maxim that if x–ic logically entails x–is, then yic
logically entails yis.19 Thus, Fi satisfies Deductive Closure. So any conjunction of the
elements of a non-redundant set Fi of ICEU maxims for i is a decision rule for that player.
Since all such conjunctions are logically equivalent, we can fix on any one of them as ‘the’
ICEU decision rule Di for player i; and, in this way, construct ‘the’ profile D of ICEU
decision rules for the game and ‘the’ ICEU common-reasoning model. This model implies a
unique common-reasoning solution, which we may unambiguously take as the ICEU
19
The reason is that, as collective predictions become (strictly) stronger, the restrictions on
probabilities required by ICEU-consistency with such predictions tighten, so making it
‘easier’ for a strategy to be expected utility maximising for all probability distributions
satisfying the restrictions and also ‘easier’ for it to be expected utility maximising for no such
probability distribution.
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common-reasoning solution (as every profile of ICEU decision rules for the game yields the
same such solution). We denote this solution by the categorisation C*.
Assume for the moment that the game has at least one ICEU Bayesian model.
Consider any such model M and let C
M
be its inclusion categorisation; necessarily, C
M
is
exhaustive. We now investigate the relationship between C
M
and C*.
M can be interpreted as a model of a situation in which each player is rational in the
ICEU sense, and in which it is common knowledge that each strategy in the positive
component of C
M
might be played, and that each strategy in the negative component will not
be played. The Bayesian modelling strategy does not try to represent how players arrive at
this common knowledge; but on the most natural interpretation, there is an implicit
assumption that they do so by some process of reasoning whose premises include (but are not
necessarily limited to) those of the ICEU standard of rationality (see Section 1). In contrast,
the ICEU common-reasoning framework explicitly models what players have reason to
believe about the game, given that the ICEU standard of rationality is axiomatic in common
reason. Thus, given our interpretation of Bayesian models, it is natural to conjecture that if
the permissibility (resp. impermissibility) of some strategy is a theorem of common reason,
then every ICEU Bayesian model includes (resp. does not include) that strategy. It is also
natural to conjecture that if the ICEU common-reasoning solution is exhaustive, then there
exists an ICEU Bayesian model that includes (resp. does not include) every strategy whose
permissibility (resp. impermissibility) is a theorem of common reason. The following
theorems establish that these conjectures are indeed correct.
Theorem 6: Consider any game in G for which an ICEU Bayesian model exists.
Consider any such model M of the game, and let its inclusion categorisation be C
M
.
Let C* be the ICEU common-reasoning solution. Then C
M * C*.
Theorem 7: For every game in G: If the ICEU common-reasoning solution C* is
exhaustive, then (i) there exists an ICEU Bayesian model of the game; and (ii) for
every such model M, the inclusion categorisation C
M
is identical to C*.
Theorem 7 establishes that, in the special case in which the ICEU common-reasoning
solution of the game is exhaustive, and with respect to the resulting categorisations, the
Bayesian and common-reasoning approaches are equivalent. In this case, the ICEU common-
reasoning model may be seen as justifying ICEU Bayesian models, in the sense that it
describes explicit steps of reasoning whereby the players could establish the permissibility of
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those strategies included in each ICEU Bayesian model and the impermissibility of all other
strategies.
But, now consider cases where the ICEU common-reasoning solution is not
exhaustive. (As we will show in Section 11, this is a genuine possibility.) Nothing we have
said in this Section excludes the possibility that such a game has an ICEU Bayesian model.
However, we know from Theorem 6 that, for every such model M, C
M * C*. Thus, the
unmodelled reasoning that players are implicitly assumed to use in any such M must be
(assumed to) enable them to arrive at common knowledge, not captured in C*, about the
possibility and impossibility of strategies. That reasoning would have to make use of axioms
and inference rules in addition to (or stronger than) those of the ICEU common-reasoning
model.
20
But if an ICEU Bayesian model requires support of this kind, there seems no a priori
reason to expect such a model to exist for all games. And, even if some such model does exist
for a given game, the additional axioms and inference rules that it requires may not be
appropriate for all contexts in which the game is played.
11. RESOLVING THE PARADOXES
We now turn to the paradoxes presented in Section 3. It is convenient to go straight to the
most problematic case – the Tom, Dick and Harry Paradox of Game 3. The paradox is that
this game has no ICEU Bayesian model.
Nevertheless, this game (like every other) has an ICEU common-reasoning solution,
which can be identified by using the recommendation algorithm. The outputs of the
algorithm are (for i = 1, 2, 3): yi
0
= #; yi
1
= pi(ini); yi
2
= yi
1
. The ICEU common-reasoning
solution is <{in1, in2, in3},>. This categorisation is non-exhaustive: for each player i, outi is
neither shown to be permissible nor shown to be impermissible.
20
It would be compatible with our general Lewisian approach to analyse interactive reasoning
systems in which common reason has additional axioms and inference rules. Indeed, Lewis’s
analysis of conventions attributes principles of salience and inductive inference to common
reason, in the context of a game played recurrently in a population (Lewis, 1969; Cubitt and
Sugden, 2003). In the case of one-shot play, game theorists often appeal to additional
resources of reasoning when rationalising solution concepts, especially in the presence of
multiple equilibria. For example, there is a tradition of postulating that players have access
to, and take as authoritative, a book containing suggestions made by the game theorist; and
that these may go beyond (but may not contradict) the implications of CKR.
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It should not be surprising if, for some reasoning scheme R and some sentence p,
neither p nor its negation is a theorem of R. The reasoning scheme R has, as resources, only
axioms in A(R) and inference rules in I(R); thus, it is hardly surprising if we can find some p
such that neither it nor its negation can be derived from those axioms using those inference
rules. The significance of the previous paragraph is that it shows that this unsurprising
general possibility applies specifically to the case where R is common reason in the ICEU
common-reasoning model of Game 3 and p any permissibility sentence referring to the
strategy outi for any player i.
As the ICEU common-reasoning solution of Game 3 is not exhaustive, it is natural to
ask whether there is any way in which the profile of decision rules in the ICEU common-
reasoning model could be strengthened to yield an exhaustive categorisation as the resulting
solution. The answer is ‘No’: for each player in Game 3, there is no decision rule stronger
than that player’s ICEU decision rule.
21
More generally, one might ask whether it is possible
to achieve an exhaustive categorisation by augmenting the interactive reasoning system that
constitutes the ICEU common-reasoning model with further axioms or inference rules.
Obviously, Theorem 4 cannot vouch for the consistency of such a construction. But we can
show that in any such interactive reasoning system that is consistent, neither the permissibility
nor the impermissibility of any outi is a theorem of common reason.
22
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A proof can be sketched as follows. For each player i of Game 3, let j(i) be the player other
than i on whose strategy i’s payoff depends. The set of maxims of an ICEU decision rule for
any player i of Game 3 can be partitioned into those whose antecedents refer to both of j(i)’s
strategies (type 1) and the remainder (type 2). Let a recommendation to i that refers to both of
i’s strategies be maximally specific. Every type 1 maxim has, as its consequent, a
recommendation to i that is maximally specific. Thus, no consequent of a type 1 maxim can
be strengthened, as the definition of a maxim forces consistency on its consequent. One can
strengthen the consequent of some type 2 maxims; but, by Deductive Closure, each such
strengthening requires an extra permissibility sentence to be conjoined to the consequent of
some type 1 maxim, in all cases inducing inconsistency in the consequent of at least one such
maxim.
22
For any profile D of decision rules, we define a generalised common-reasoning model as an
interactive reasoning system < P0, R*, (R1, …, Rn)> which satisfies amended versions of the
conditions used to define the common-reasoning model. Specifically, ‘A(R*) = …’ and ‘A(Ri)
= …’ in conditions (1) and (3) respectively are replaced by ‘A(R*) …’ and ‘A(Ri) …’ so
as to allow additional axioms, and the clauses ‘and no other rules’ in conditions (2) and (4)
are deleted, so as to allow additional inference rules. It can be shown that, in any generalised
common-reasoning model of Game 3, if D is the profile of ICEU decision rules, p1(out1) 
T(R*) [¬p3(out3)]  T(R*) p2(out2)  T(R*) [¬p1(out1)]  T(R*), and [¬p1(out1)] 
T(R*) p3(out3)  T(R*) [¬p2(out2)]  T(R*) p1(out1)  T(R*), where we use now
as material implication in our own analysis. Thus, neither p1(out1) nor ¬p1(out1) can be a
theorem of a consistent R*.
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If our modelling framework is accepted, the implication is this: given common
knowledge of the ICEU standard of rationality, there is no way in which players could reason
their way to the conclusion that the permissibility or impermissibility of outi, for any player i,
was common knowledge. However, an ICEU Bayesian model of Game 3, were it to exist,
would rest on the implicit assumption that the players had reasoned their way to such a
conclusion. Given this analysis, the non-existence of an ICEU Bayesian model is not
surprising.
This analysis also provides the key to the other paradoxes. Consider the Proving Too
Much Paradox of Game 1. For this game, as for all two-player games, a family of ICEU
Bayesian models exists. The paradox, as we originally presented it, is that certain
propositions about the choiceworthiness of strategies, namely those summarised by S1* =
{first} and S2* = {left, right}, hold for all ICEU Bayesian models of Game 1, but there seems
no way that the players could arrive at common knowledge of those propositions using only
reasoning resources attributed to them by the assumption that the ICEU standard of rationality
is common knowledge. Now that we have developed the concept of a common-reasoning
model, we can tighten up the ‘there seems no way ...’ clause. The ICEU common-reasoning
solution tells us what conclusions about choiceworthiness (or permissibility) can be arrived at
by players who have just those reasoning resources and how they can arrive at them.
In the case of Game 1, with the ICEU common standard of practical rationality, the
outputs of the recommendation algorithm are: y1
0
= y2
0
= #; y1
1
= ¬p1(third), y2
1
= #; y1
2
=
¬p1(third), y2
2
= p2(left); y1
3
= y1
2
, y2
3
= y2
2
. The ICEU common-reasoning solution is <{left},
{third}>. As with Game 1, this solution is not exhaustive: first, second and right are neither
shown to be permissible nor shown to be impermissible. So the intuition on which the initial
statement of the paradox is based is correct. Any ICEU Bayesian model of Game 1 must
therefore rest on the implicit assumption that players have access to resources of reasoning
beyond those arising from the ICEU standard of practical rationality being common
knowledge among them, and that those resources enable them to arrive at common knowledge
of an exhaustive categorisation. We are not entitled to make this assumption merely by virtue
of the existence of some Bayesian model of Game 1. Thus, the fact that first and right are
choiceworthy in all Bayesian models of that game does not imply that the choiceworthiness of
those strategies is an implication of common knowledge of ICEU rationality per se. Rather, it
is an implication of the Bayesian representation of that common knowledge. That
representation is premised on an implicit assumption to which the ICEU common-reasoning
model lends no support.
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The Three-Lane Road Paradox of Game 2 can be resolved in a similar way.
Proposition 2 establishes that ICEU Bayesian models of Game 2 can be partitioned into two
classes – those models Mc for which the inclusion categorisation is CMc = <{in1, in2, out2},
{out1}>, and those models Ms for which the inclusion categorisation is CMs = <{in1, out1, in2},
{out2}>. The paradox is that each of these models appears to represent a situation in which
the players have common knowledge of an asymmetry between what rationality requires of
one of them and what it requires of the other, even though the formal structure of the game is
symmetric.
Again, we can use an ICEU common-reasoning model to discover what conclusions
players can reach by reasoning that uses only those axioms and inference rules that represent
common knowledge of the ICEU standard. For Game 2, the outputs of the corresponding
recommendation algorithm are (for i = 1, 2): yi
0
= #; yi
1
= pi(ini); yi
2
= yi
1
. The ICEU
common-reasoning solution is <{in1, in2},>; again, it is not exhaustive. There is no
asymmetry between the players in this solution, but, for each player i, outi is neither shown to
be permissible nor shown to be impermissible. As in the other games, we are not generally
entitled to assume that the players have access to additional (or stronger) axioms and
inference rules that allow them to arrive at an exhaustive categorisation of strategies by
common reasoning, because that assumption can only hold if the additional axioms and
inference rules induce an asymmetry between the players.
23
If there is no source of
asymmetry, the Bayesian modelling strategy must fail.
12. CONCLUSION
Our objective has been to investigate the relationship between two ways of understanding one
of the core concepts of game theory – common knowledge of rationality (CKR). On one
understanding, canonically expressed by Aumann (1987), CKR is represented by a model of
what players know about one another’s strategy choices, conditional on every possible event.
Each player’s choices are required to be decision-theoretically rational with respect to her
knowledge and beliefs, and the event represented by the model itself is required to be
common knowledge. The strategies available to each player can then be partitioned into those
23
Using a similar argument to that deployed for Game 3, it can be shown that there are no
decision rules for Game 2 that are stronger than the ICEU decision rules. However,
additional axioms or inference rules might be included in a generalised common-reasoning
model, and such a model might be consistent, unlike the case considered in footnote 22.
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that are and are not played in the model, and since the model is common knowledge, those
binary partitions are common knowledge too. On the alternative understanding, inspired by
Lewis (1969) and developed here with our concept of a common-reasoning model, CKR is
represented by the axioms and inference rules of a mode of ‘common reasoning’ that each
player endorses and attributes to the others. This approach induces a trinary partition of each
player’s strategy set, since a given strategy can have one of three statuses in common reason –
it can be shown to be permissible, shown to be impermissible, or neither.
By modelling reasoning, the Lewisian approach provides formal resources with which
to assess the implicit assumption of the Bayesian model, formalised in Section 2 and based on
Aumann’s canonical contribution, that, if CKR holds, then players can arrive at a binary
partition of strategies into those that are rationally playable and those that are not. We have
shown that, for a given standard of practical rationality, our common-reasoning model
grounds this implicit assumption when, but only when, the resulting common-reasoning
solution is exhaustive. Since this condition may fail, there can be conceptions of practical
rationality common knowledge of which cannot be represented in a Bayesian model without
creating the potential for puzzling or contradictory results such as those of Section 3. In
contrast, we have shown that the Lewisian approach has no need to restrict the conception of
practical rationality beyond a requirement of internal coherence.
To repeat what we said at the outset, we recognise that the paradoxes of Section 3 can
be circumvented by various (non-Lewisian) adaptations of the Bayesian framework. The
central contribution of this paper does not depend on our analysis of what we see as
paradoxical implications of Aumann’s approach, nor on whether we are right to see those
implications as paradoxes, rather than as minor curiosities or as evidence against the
particular conception of practical rationality that gives rise to them. Our core contribution is
the provision of formal and general foundations for Lewisian solution concepts in game
theory.
We have proposed, and derived from a model of reasoning, a very general solution
concept – that of a ‘common-reasoning solution’ – which defines a trinary partition of
strategies for any given normal-form game and any given coherent concept of practical
rationality for that game. This proposal defines a path of possible research in which
alternative conceptions of practical rationality are specified, properties of the resulting
common-reasoning solutions analysed, and their relationships to existing concepts studied.
Cubitt and Sugden (2011) can be seen as taking initial steps along this path, in view of the
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relationship (described in Appendix 1) between their ‘categorisation solutions’ and common-
reasoning solutions. We expect that solution concepts that are generated in this way will
often be quite distinct from those of standard game theory. The reason for that expectation is
that few existing solution concepts are defined in terms of trinary partitions of strategies, but
such partitions reflect the underlying structure of common-reasoning models. More basically,
they stem from a fundamental feature of reasoning itself.
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APPENDIX 1: CATEGORISATION PROCEDURES AND RECOMMENDATION
ALGORITHMS
Cubitt and Sugden (2011) (henceforth CS11) defines a class of ‘categorisation procedures’,
which operate on the strategies of a given game. In this appendix, we demonstrate a
relationship between CS11’s concept and that of a recommendation algorithm introduced in
Section 8. This allows us to use a result from CS11, together with new results presented here,
as ingredients for our main proofs presented in Appendix 2.
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As we have demonstrated in
Section 8 that the recommendation algorithm, for a given profile of decision rules, tracks
steps of common reasoning in the corresponding common-reasoning model, the formal results
of this appendix also substantiate CS11’s informal claim that categorisation procedures may
be interpreted as tracking reasoning that players can undertake.
Our analysis applies to any given game in G. We begin by extending the concepts
introduced in Section 9, in a way that follows CS11. Section 9 defined the concepts of a
categorisation of Si, for any player i, and of a categorisation of  iNc Si, for any non-empty set
Nc  N. We now require the case where Nc = N\{i}, for any player i, as well as that (already
introduced) where Nc = N. We use  –i as a shorthand for iN\{i} Si; the positive and negative
components of a categorisation of the latter set will typically be denoted  –i+ and  –i–.
We denote the set of categorisations of Si, the set of categorisations of  –i and the set
of categorisations of  by, respectively, )(Si), )( –i) and )( ). The null categorisation <,
> is an element of each of these sets. Where convenient, we use Ci, Cic, and so on, to denote
particular categorisations in )(Si); C–i, C–ic, and so on, to denote particular categorisations in
)( –i); and C, Cc, and so on, to denote particular categorisations in )( ). We extend to
categorisations in )(Si) and )( –i), in the obvious way, the definitions of the relations *
(‘has weakly more content than’) and of * (‘has strictly more content than’), introduced in
Section 9 for categorisations in )( ). (See CS11, Section 2, for details.)
We define a categorisation function for player i as a function fi: )( –i)o)(Si) with the
followingMonotonicity property: for all C–ic, C–is  )( –i), if C–is * C–ic then fi(C–is) *
fi(C–ic).
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In proving the results of this appendix, we do not assume the truth of any of the results
stated in the main text of the current paper. This ensures that the results of this appendix can
be used in the proofs in Appendix 2. In commenting on Proposition A3 (below), we do note
its significance when conjoined with Theorem 5; but this interpretative passage is not
involved in the proof of either result.
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The content of a given profile f = (f1, …, fn) of categorisation functions can be
H[SUHVVHGDVDVLQJOHIXQFWLRQȗ)( )o)( ), constructed as follows. Let C = < +,  –> be
any categorisation of  . For each player i, define C–i = < +\Si,  –\Si>. Next, define Si+c and Si–c
as, respectively, the positive and negative components of fi(C–i)LQDOO\GHILQHȗC) = *iN
<Si
+c, Si–c!:HZLOOVD\WKDWȗsummarises f$IXQFWLRQȗ)( )o)( ) that summarises
some profile f of categorisation functions is an aggregate categorisation function.
)RUDQ\DJJUHJDWHFDWHJRULVDWLRQIXQFWLRQȗZHGHILQHWKHcategorisation procedure
by the following pair of instructions, which generate a sequence of categorisations C(k) {
< +(k),  –(k)> of  , for successive stages k  {0, 1, 2, ….}, inductively, as follows:
(i) Initiation rule. Set C(0) = <,>;
(ii) Continuation rule. For all k > 0, set C(k ȗ>C(k–1)].
The procedure halts at the lowest value of kc for which C(kc) = C(kc–1); this value of kc will be
denoted by k*. C(k*) is the categorisation solutionRIWKHJDPHUHODWLYHWRȗ&6SURYHV
the following result (their Proposition 1):
Proposition A1: Consider any game in GDQGOHWȗEHDQ\DJJUHJDWHFDWHJRULVDWLRQ
IXQFWLRQIRUWKHJDPH7KHFDWHJRULVDWLRQSURFHGXUHIRUȗKDVWKHIROORZLQJ
properties:
(i) For all k  {1, 2, ….}, C(k) * C(k–1).
LL7KHSURFHGXUHKDOWVGHILQLQJDXQLTXHFDWHJRULVDWLRQVROXWLRQUHODWLYHWRȗ
We can now relate these concepts from CS11 to those introduced in Sections 6–8, by
exploiting a correspondence between decision rules and categorisation functions.
Recall that a decision rule Di, for player i, is a conjunction of all elements of a set Fi of
maxims of the form x–i yi, where x–i is a collective prediction about N\{i}, yi is a
recommendation to i, and Fi satisfies Distinct Antecedents and Deductive Closure. The
content of any recommendation yi can be expressed by specifying two subsets of Si: the set Si
+
of strategies which are stated by yi to be permissible for i, and the set Si
–
of strategies which
are stated to be impermissible. The definition of a recommendation ensures that Ci = <Si
+
, Si
–
>
is a categorisation of Si. We will say that Ci encodes yi. Similarly, the content of any
collective prediction x–i can be encoded as a unique categorisation C–i of  –i, the positive
(resp. negative) component of which contains all strategies stated by x–i to be possible (resp.
impossible). (The null sentence #, whether viewed as a recommendation or as a collective
prediction, is encoded by <,>.) Thus, each maxim in Fi is encoded by an ordered pair of
the form <C–i, Ci>. Because Di satisfies Distinct Antecedents, no two such ordered pairs have
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the same C–i. If there is any C–i which is not the antecedent of any maxim stated by Di, this
fact can be encoded as the ordered pair <C–i, <,>>. Thus, Di is encoded by a set of
ordered pairs <C–i, Ci>; and, since each C–i  )( –i) appears in exactly one of these ordered
pairs, Di itself is encoded by a unique function fi from )( –i) to )(Si).
The following result establishes that, for any decision rule Di, the function fi which
encodes Di is a categorisation function.
Proposition A2: For every game in G, for every player i, and for every decision rule
Di for i, the function fi that encodes Di satisfies Monotonicity.
Proposition A2 implies that, for any profile D = (D1, ..., Dn) of decision rules, there
exists a unique profile f = (f1, …, fn) of categorisation functions and, thus, a unique aggregate
FDWHJRULVDWLRQIXQFWLRQȗVXFKWKDWȗVXPPDULVHVf and, for each player i, fi encodes Di. We
ZLOOVD\WKDWȗencodes D.
Recall from Section 8 that any profile D of decision rules also defines a
recommendation algorithm. This algorithm generates, for each player i, an output yi
k
, for
each of its stages k = 0, 1, 2, ..., where each such output is a recommendation to i. Since any
such recommendation is encoded by a categorisation of Si, and such categorisations can be
aggregated across players, the combined output of each stage k of the recommendation
algorithm is encoded by a categorisation of  , defined as *iN <Si+(k), Si–(k)> where, for
each i, <Si
+
(k), Si
–
(k)> encodes yi
k
. We can now state:
Proposition A3: Consider any game in G, and any profile D of decision rules for its
SOD\HUV/HWȗEHWKHDJJUHJDWHFDWHJRULVDWLRQIXQFWLRQWKDWHQFRGHVD. For each k 
{0, 1, 2, …}, the categorisation generated for stage k of the categorisation procedure
IRUȗHQFRGHVWKHFRPELQHGRXWSXWRIVWDJHk of the recommendation algorithm for D.
Propositions A1 – A3 are the results from this appendix which are used as ingredients
for Appendix 2.
Proposition A3, combined with earlier results, is of independent interest in relation to
CS11. The analysis of Sections 7-9 above implies that, for any profile D of decision rules,
the theorems of R* in the resulting common-reasoning model, insofar as they relate to
permissibility and impermissibility of strategies, are identified by the combined final output
of the recommendation algorithm for D and encoded by the common-reasoning solution for
D7KXV3URSRVLWLRQ$HVWDEOLVKHVWKDWLIȗLVWKHDJJUHJDWHFDWHJRULVDWLRQIXQFWLRQWKDW
encodes DWKHQWKHFDWHJRULVDWLRQVROXWLRQIRUȗDQGWKHFRPPRQUHDVRQLQJVROXWLRQIRUD
are identical. This demonstrates a precise sense in which a Lewisian understanding of CKR
underpins CSS11’s categorisation solutions.
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We end this appendix with proofs of Propositions A2 and A3:
Proof of Proposition A2: By definition, Di is a conjunction of all elements of a set Fi of
maxims for i, which satisfies Distinct Antecedents and Deductive Closure. Let fi be the
function that encodes Di and suppose that it does not satisfy Monotonicity. Then there are C–
ic, C–is  )( –i) such that C–is * C–ic and not fi(C–is) * fi(C–ic). So Fi contains maxims x–ic
 yic and x–is  yis, such that (i) x–is entails x–ic and (ii) yis does not entail yic. Notice that (ii)
implies that yic is non-null. Because of (i), the conjunction of these maxims entails x–is  yic.
So, by Deductive Closure, Fi contains a maxim x–i* yi* where x–i* is logically equivalent to
x–is and yi* entails yic. But because of Distinct Antecedents, this requires x–i* = x–is and hence
yi* = yis. Thus yis entails yicFRQWUDGLFWLQJLLƑ
Proof of Proposition A3: Consider any profile D of decision rules for any game in G and let
ȗEHWKHDJJUHJDWHFDWHJRULVDWLRQIXQFWLRQWKDWHQFRGHVD. Let the sequences C(0), C(1), ….
and CƍCƍ«EHUHVSHFWLYHO\WKHVHTXHQFHRIFDWHJRULVDWLRQVJHQHUDWHGE\WKH
FDWHJRULVDWLRQSURFHGXUHIRUȗDQGWKHVHTXHQFHRIFDWHJRULVDWLRQVWKDWHQFRGHWKHFRPELQHG
outputs of successive stages of the recommendation algorithm for D. Consider any k  {1, 2,
…}. From the continuation rule of the categorisation procedure, C(k ȗ>C(k–1)]. Now
consider stage k of the recommendation algorithm. As Cƍk–1) encodes the combined output
of stage k–1 of the recommendation algorithm, the specification of operations 1, 2 and 3 of
WKDWDOJRULWKPWRJHWKHUZLWKWKHIDFWWKDWȗHQFRGHVD, imply that Cƍk ȗ>Cƍk–1)]. Thus, if
C(k–1) = Cƍk–1), it follows that C(k) = Cƍk). The Proposition follows, by induction, if C(0)
= CƍDFRQGLWLRQJXDUDQWHHGE\WKHUHVSHFWLYHLQLWLDWLRQUXOHVRIWKHFDWHJRULVDWLRQ
procedure and recommendation algorithm (combined, in the latter case, with # being encoded
by <,!Ƒ
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APPENDIX 2: PROOFS OF RESULTS FROMMAIN TEXT
Proof of Theorem 1: For any game in G, let U: So [0, 1] be a probability distribution over
the set S of strategy profiles. U is a correlated equilibrium if, for all i  N, for all functions gi:
Si o Si, ¦sS U(s) (ui[s] – ui[Vi(s, gi[si])]) t 0. From Nash’s existence result for finite games
(Nash, 1951, Theorem 1) and the fact that any Nash equilibrium corresponds to a correlated
equilibrium, existence of a correlated equilibrium is guaranteed for every game in G.
Consider any such game and take any correlated equilibrium U* of the game. We can
construct a Bayesian model of the game as follows: Define S* = {s  S | U*(s) > 0} and : so
that there is a one-one mapping from S* onto :. For each s  S*, let Z(s) denote the
corresponding element of :. Define the behaviour function b(.) so that b(Z[s]) = s. Define
the information structure I such that, for each player i, for each strategy si  Si*: E(si)  I i.
Define a function S*: :o [0, 1] such that, for each s  S*, S*(Z(s)) = U*(s). Note that this
implies that ¦Z: S*(Z) = 1; and that S*(Z) > 0 for all Z  : (so that, in addition, for each
player i and each E  I i, ¦ZE S*(Z) > 0). In view of this, define the profile S of priors such
that, for each player i: Si = S*. Define the profile F of choiceworthiness functions such that,
for each player i, at each state Z, Fi(Z) is the set of strategies that are SEU-rational at Z with
respect to I i and Si. By construction, the Bayesian model <:, b(.),I , S, F> satisfies SEU-
Maximization and Knowledge of Own Choice. Since U* is a correlated equilibrium, it
follows that, for each player i, for each state Z  :: bi(Z) is SEU-rational at Z. Hence, bi(Z)
 Fi(ZZKLFKHQWDLOVWKDW&KRLFH5DWLRQDOLW\LVVDWLVILHGƑ
Preliminaries for proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 and Theorems 2, 6 and 7: For results
concerning ICEU Bayesian models, it is convenient to begin by establishing some results and
terminology used in several subsequent proofs.
Lemma A1: For any game in G, for any Bayesian model of that game, for any player i,
for any si  Si* such that Si[E(si)] > 0, and for any s–i = (s1, ..., si–1, si+1, ..., sn)  S–i
such that, for each player jzi, sj  Sj*, the following is true: If i’s prior Si is
independent then: Si[E(s–i)_ E(si)] = Si[E(s–i)].
Proof: Consider any i N; any si  Si* such that Si[E(si)] > 0; and any s–i = (s1, ..., si–1, si+1,
..., sn)  S–i such that, for each player jzi, sj  Sj*. By definition, Si[E(s–i)_ E(si)] = Si[E(s–i) 
E(si)]/ Si[E(si)]. If Si is independent, Si[E(s–i)  E(si)] = 3jN Si[E(sj)] and Si[E(s–i)] = 3jzi
Si[E(sj)]. Thus, Si[E(s–i)_ E(si)] = 3jN Si[E(sj)]/ Si[E(si)] = 3jzi Si[E(sj)] = Si[E(s–i@Ƒ
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For any game in G, consider a Bayesian model of the game in which the profile of priors is S
= (S1, ..., Sn), any player i, any si  Si, and any event E, such that E is the union of one or
more elements of i’s information partition I i. Define Ui(si| E) as the expected value of ui(s),
given that player i chooses si and that the probability distribution over S–i is determined by
conditioning i’s prior Si on the event E. We will say that si  Si is unconditionally EU-
maximising for player i if, for all sic  Si, Ui(si|:Ui(sic|:).
Lemma A2: For any game in G, for any ICEU Bayesian model of that game, for any
distinct players i and j, for any si  Si, the following three statements are equivalent:
(a) si  Si*.
(b) Sj[E(si)] > 0.
(c) si is unconditionally expected utility maximising for i.
Proof: Consider any game in G, any ICEU Bayesian model of that game, any distinct players i
and j, and any si  Si.
First, suppose (a) holds. By Choice Rationality, there is some Z  : such that bi[Z] =
si and si Fi(Z). Let E be the event such that Z  E  Ij . Caution implies Sj(E(si)|E) > 0
which in turn (as posteriors are obtained from priors by Bayesian updating) implies (b).
Conversely, suppose (b) holds. It is then immediate (from the definition of a prior) that there
is some Z  : such that bi[Z] = si. Thus, (a) and (b) are equivalent. This is Result 1. From
Result 1, it will suffice to show that (a) implies (c) and (c) implies (b).
Suppose (a) holds. Then, from Choice Rationality and SEU-Maximisation, Ui(si| E
Ui(sic| E) for all sic  Si and for all E such that E  E(si) and E  I i. Since this inequality
holds for each such E, it must also hold for their union. By Knowledge of Own Choice, the
union of all such events E is E(si). Thus, for all sic  Si, Ui(si| E[si@Ui(sic| E[si]). By
Independence, using Lemma A1, the probability distribution over S–i that is determined by
conditioning Si on E(si) is identical to that determined by conditioning Si on :. Thus, for all
sic  Si, Ui(si|:Ui(sic| :), i.e. si is unconditionally EU-maximising. Thus, (a) implies (c).
Finally, suppose (c) holds but (b) does not. From Result 1, (a) does not hold. But,
since Si* is non-empty, there must be some sicsi such that sic Si*. Consider any such sic.
By Knowledge of Own Choice, E(sic) is the union of some elements of I i. By Independence,
using Lemma A1, and the fact that si is unconditionally EU-maximising, Ui(si| E[sic]) t Ui(sic|
E[sic]). So there must be some event Ec  E(sic) such that Ec I i and Ui(si| Ec) t Ui(sic| Ec).
Since, by Choice Rationality and SEU-Maximisation, sic is SEU-rational for i at each state Z
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 Ec, the same must be true of si. So, by Choice Rationality, si Fi(Z), for all Z  Ec; and
hence, by Caution, the following is true: for all Z  Ec, Sj(E(si)|E) > 0, where E is the event
such that Z  E  Ij. Since posteriors are obtained from priors by Bayesian updating, (b)
PXVWKROG±DFRQWUDGLFWLRQ7KXVFLPSOLHVEƑ
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose initially that an ICEU Bayesian model of Game 1 exists;
and consider any such model. For player 1, third is not unconditionally EU-maximising
with respect to any probability distribution over player 2’s strategies. Thus, by Lemma A2,
third  S1*. Suppose (this is Supposition 1) that second  S1* and right  S2*. By Lemma
A2, this implies that S2(E(second)) > 0. Then right is not unconditionally EU-maximising,
and so by Lemma A2, right  S2*, contradicting Supposition 1. Therefore Supposition 1 is
false. Now suppose (this is Supposition 2) that second  S1*. By the falsity of Supposition 1,
right  S2*. Since S2* is non-empty, S2* = {left}. Then, second is not unconditionally EU-
maximising, and so by Lemma A2, second  S1*, contradicting Supposition 2. Therefore
Supposition 2 is false. Since S1* is non-empty, S1* = {first}. This implies that each of left
and right is unconditionally EU-maximising and hence, by Lemma A2, S2* = {left, right}.
Now, to prove existence of ICEU Bayesian models of Game 1, we proceed by construction in
the light of these conditions. First, set : = {Z1, Z2} and specify a behaviour function and
choiceworthiness functions such that b1(Z1) = b1(Z2) = F1(Z1) = F1(Z2) = {first}, b2(Z1) =
{left}, b2(Z2) = {right} and F2(Z1) = F2(Z2) = {left, right}. Then, set I 1 = {{Z1, Z2}} and I 2
= {{Z1}, {Z2}} and specify a profile of priors such that S1(Z1) = S2(Z1) = Q, where 1 > Q > 0.
Choice Rationality, Knowledge of Own Choice, Independence and Caution hold by
construction; and it is trivial to show that SEU-Maximisation is satisfied whenever QVR
GHPRQVWUDWLQJH[LVWHQFHDQGPXOWLSOLFLW\Ƒ
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose initially that an ICEU Bayesian model of Game 2 exists; and
consider any such model. Using Lemma A2, it is straightforward to show that S1* = {in1}
S2* = {in2, out2}; that S1* = {out1} S2* = {in2}; and that S1* = {in1, out1} S2* = {in2}.
Symmetrically, by Lemma A2, S2* = {in2} S1* = {in1, out1}, S2* = {out2} S1* = {in1},
and S2* = {in2, out2} S1* = {in1}. Given that S1* and S2* are non-empty, these material
implications can be satisfied simultaneously only if either (i) S1* = {in1} and S2* = {in2, out2}
or (ii) S1* = {in1, out1} and S2* = {in2}. Now, we prove by construction existence and
multiplicity of ICEU Bayesian models of Game 2 in which (i) holds. (An analogous
procedure establishes the corresponding result for models in which (ii) holds.) First, set : =
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{Z1, Z2} and specify a behaviour function and choiceworthiness functions such that b1(Z1) =
b1(Z2) = F1(Z1) = F1(Z2) = {in1}, b2(Z1) = {in2}, b2(Z2) = {out2} and F2(Z1) = F2(Z2) = {in2,
out2}. Then, set I 1 = {{Z1, Z2}} and I 2 = {{Z1}, {Z2}}. Finally, specify a profile of priors
such that S1(Z1) = S2(Z1) = Q, where 1 > Q > 0. For any such Q, Choice Rationality, SEU-
Maximisation, Knowledge of Own Choice, Independence, and Caution all hold. Ƒ
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that an ICEU Bayesian model of Game 3 exists. First, suppose
(Supposition 1) that there are two distinct players i, j such that outi  Si* and outj  Sj*.
Because of the symmetries of the game, there is no loss of generality in setting i = 1 and j = 2.
This implies, by Lemma A2, that S1(E(out2)) > 0. Hence, out1 is not unconditionally EU-
maximising and so, by a further application of Lemma A2, out1  S1*, a contradiction. So
Supposition 1 is false. Since there are three players, this entails that there are two distinct
players i, j such that outi  Si* and outj  Sj*. Without loss of generality, set i = 1 and j = 2.
Since S2* is non-empty, S2* = {in2}. Then out1 is unconditionally EU-maximising and so, by
Lemma A2, out1  SiDFRQWUDGLFWLRQ7KXV*DPHKDVQR,&(8%D\HVLDQPRGHOƑ
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider any interactive reasoning system <P0, R*, (R1, …, Rn)> among
the population N. Suppose that, for some p  M(P0), p  T(R*). The proof works by repeated
application of the same sequence of steps, using the three conditions of the definition of an
interactive reasoning system, beginning as follows:
(1) p  T(R*) (by supposition)
(2) for all i  N: R*(p)  T(Ri) (from (1), using Awareness)
(3) for all i  N: p  T(Ri) (from (2), using Authority)
(4) for all j  N: Rj(p)  T(R*) (from (1), using Attribution)
(5) for all i, j  N: R*(Rj[p])  T(Ri) (from (4), using Awareness)
(6) for all i, j  N: Rj(p)  T(Ri) (from (5), using Authority)
(7) for all i, j  N: Ri(Rj[p])  T(R*) (from (4), using Attribution)
… and so on, indefinitely.
The role played by p in (1), (2), (3) is played by Rj(p) in (4), (5), (6), by Ri[Rj(p)] in (7), (8),
(9), … and so on. Lines (3), (6), (9), … establish that there is iterated reason to believe p in
NƑ
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Proof of Theorem 4: Consider any game in G, and any profile D = (D1, ..., Dn) of decision
rules for its players. Let < P0, R*, (R1, …, Rn)> be the common-reasoning model of the game,
defined in relation to D.
We begin by defining, as a counterpart to R*, an inference structure R–* which has the
same domain and axioms as R* but different inference rules. The strategy of the proof is to
define R–* so that it can replicate all the steps of the recommendation algorithm, but can do
little else. To do this, we define the following sets of inference rules. I1 consists of the rules
of logically valid inference. I2 is the set of inference rules of the form «from {p}, infer Ri(p)»,
where p  M(P0) and i  N. I3 is the set of inference rules of the form «from {Ri(yi)}, infer
zi», where i  N, yi is a recommendation to i, and zi is the prediction about i that is the
correlate of yi. I4 is the set of inference rules of the form «from {yi}, infer zi», where i  N, yi
is a recommendation to i, and zi is the prediction about i that is the correlate of yi. I5 is the set
of inference rules of the form «from {z1, ..., zi –1, z i+1, ..., zn}, infer z1  ...  zi –1  zi+1  ... 
zn», where i  N and each zj is a prediction about the relevant player j. I6 is the set of
inference rules of the form «from {Di, x–i}, infer yi», where i  N, x–i is a collective prediction
about N\{i}, x–i is logically equivalent to the antecedent of some maxim stated by Di, and yi is
the consequent of that maxim.
R* is fully specified by its domain M(P0) and axiom set A(R*), and by the condition
that the set of its inference rules is I1  I2  I3. We define R–* as the inference structure that
has the domain M(P0), the axiom set A(R–*) = A(R*) and the set of inference rules I4  I5  I6.
Note that this implies that R–* does not have all rules of logically valid inference.
$VHVWDEOLVKHGLQ$SSHQGL[WKHUHLVDXQLTXHDJJUHJDWHFDWHJRULVDWLRQIXQFWLRQȗ
which encodes D. Let < +*,  –!EHWKHFDWHJRULVDWLRQVROXWLRQRIWKHJDPHUHODWLYHWRȗ
existence of which is established by Proposition A1.
The proof of Theorem 4 uses the following lemmas:
Lemma A3: For each i  N and for each si  Si: (i) si   +* if, and only if, pi(si) is
stated by some theorem in T(R–*); (ii) si   –* if, and only if, ¬pi(si) is stated by some
theorem in T(R–*); (iii) si   +* if, and only if, mi(si) is stated by some theorem in
T(R–*); (iv) si   –* if, and only if, ¬mi(si) is stated by some theorem in T(R–*).
Proof: For the purposes of this proof, we extend the definitions of ‘encoding’, given in
Section 9 and Appendix 1, to allow consistent sets of permissibility or possibility sentences
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for the set of players N to be encoded by categorisations of  . In the case of permissibility, a
strategy si is assigned to the positive (resp. negative) component of the encoding
categorisation if, and only if, pi(si) (resp. ¬pi[si]) is in the relevant encoded set. Similarly, in
the case of possibility, si is assigned to the positive (resp. negative) component of the
encoding categorisation if, and only if, mi(si) (resp. ¬mi[si]) is in the relevant encoded set.
We now define a proof algorithm which progressively ‘discovers’ the content of the
set T(R–*) by following a particular sequence of steps of reasoning that are licensed by the
axioms and inference rules of R–*. The set of theorems discovered up to the end of any step l
is denoted Tl(R–*). The algorithm is initiated by defining T0(R–*) = A(R–*). At each step l =
1, 2, …, one of the three sets of inference rules is used. I4 is used at l = 1, 4, 7, …, I5 is used at
l = 2, 5, 8, …, and I6 is used at l = 3, 6, 9... . For each step l > 0, Tl is defined as the union of
Tl–1 and the set of sentences that can be inferred from subsets of Tl–1 using inference rules in
the set specified for step l. For k = 0, 1, 2, … we define Cc(k) as the categorisation that
encodes the intersection of T3k (R–*) and the set of permissibility sentences. In other words,
after every ‘cycle’ of three steps, the set of ‘permissibility theorems so far discovered’ is
encoded. Since the intersection of T0(R–*) and the set of permissibility sentences is {#},
Cc(0) = <,>. If a step 3k* > 0 is reached at which Cc(k*) = Cc(k*–1), the proof algorithm
halts. The specification of the algorithm guarantees that, if it halts, no theorems of R–* remain
to be discovered, i.e. that T3k*(R–*) = T(R–*).
In each cycle of three steps, the reasoning carried out by the proof algorithm
corresponds with the three operations of one stage of the recommendation algorithm, defined
LQ6HFWLRQ7KXVVLQFHȗHQFRGHVD, Proposition A3 implies that, Cc(k) = C(k ȗ>Cc(k – 1)]
 ȗ>C(k – 1)], for all k > 0, where C(k) and C(k– 1) are categorisations generated by the
FDWHJRULVDWLRQSURFHGXUHIRUȗGHILQHGLQ$SSHQGL[$VCc(0) = C(0) = <,>, by
definition, the sequence of categorisations Cc(0), Cc(1), …. defined by the proof algorithm is
LGHQWLFDOWRWKDWJHQHUDWHGE\WKHFDWHJRULVDWLRQSURFHGXUHIRUȗ7KXVE\3URSRVLWLRQ$WKH
proof algorithm halts at some finite k*. Since that algorithm halts only when all theorems of
R–* have been discovered, the categorisation solution C(k*) encodes all (and only) those
permissibility sentences that are stated by theorems of R–*. This proves parts (i) and (ii) of
Lemma A3. The ‘only if’ implications of parts (iii) and (iv) follow from parts (i) and (ii),
together with R–* having the inference rules in I4. The ‘if’ implications of parts (iii) and (iv)
also follow from parts (i) and (ii) because A(R–*) contains no possibility sentences other than
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#, and I(R–*) contains no inference rules which have possibility sentences as conclusions,
other than those in I4Ƒ
Lemma A4: T(R–*) is consistent.
Proof: Let #
n–1
denote the conjunction of n – 1 instances of #. By inspection of the axioms
and inference rules of R–*, T(R–*) can be partitioned into three subsets T
1
, T
2
, and T
3
, defined
as follows: T
1
= A(R–*)  {#n–1}; T2 = {p  T(R–*) | p is a conjunction of one or more
predictions about players, at least one of which is non-null}; T
3
= {p  T(R–*) | p is a non-null
recommendation to some i}. From the definitions of these subsets, Lemma A3 implies that,
for each player i, the set of strategies for i whose permissibility (resp. impermissibility) is
stated by some recommendation in T
3
is identical to the set of strategies for i in the positive
(resp. negative) component of the categorisation solution. As that solution is a categorisation
of  , it follows from the definition of a categorisation that T3 is consistent. Since each
element of T
2
is a conjunction of a set of correlates of elements of T
3
, and since T
3
is
consistent, T
2
is consistent. The non-null elements of T
1
are decision rules for different
players, so that, from the definition of a decision rule, T
1
is consistent. Since the elements of
T
2
are conjunctions of predictions, since the non-null elements of T
1
are conjunctions of
material implications whose consequents are recommendations, and since T
1
and T
2
are each
consistent, T
1  T2 is consistent. Finally, by the specification of I6 and the fact that every
sentence in T
3
is the conclusion of an application of an inference rule in I6, every sentence in
T
3
is logically entailed by T
1  T2. Thus, T1  T2  T3, i.e. T(R–*), is consistent. Ƒ
Lemma A5: (i) T(R*) is consistent. (ii) For each i  N, and for each si  Si: (a) pi(si)
 T(R*) if, and only if, pi(si)  T(R–*); (b) [¬pi(si)]  T(R*) if, and only if, [¬pi(si)] 
T(R–*).
Proof: By Lemma A4, T(R–*) is consistent. Recall that A(R*) = A(R–*). R* differs from R–*
only in the following respect: R* has the set of inference rules I1  I2  I3 while R–* has the
set I4  I5  I6. The only effect of substituting I2  I3 for I4 is to allow additional theorems of
the form Ri(p) to be derived. This cannot be a source of inconsistency in T(R*) because R*
has no inference rule by which theorems of the form Ri(p) can be derived. The only effect
of substituting I1 for I5  I6 is to give R* all (rather than only some) rules of valid inference.
Since (by definition) all decision rules satisfy Deductive Closure, I6 allows R–* to infer, for
any player i, from any given collective prediction x–i about the other players, a
recommendation yi which conjoins all the permissibility sentences for i that are logically
entailed by {Di, x–i}. Thus, given that T(R–*) is consistent, the substitution of I1 for I5  I6
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cannot induce inconsistency in T(R*). This proves part (i) of the lemma. Given that T(R*)
and T(R–*) are consistent, that A(R*) = A(R–*), and that all decision rules satisfy Deductive
Closure, any permissibility sentence that can be derived from A(R*) using inference rules in I1
 I2  I3 can also be derived from A(R–*) using inference rules in I4  I5  I6, and vice versa.
This proves part (ii). Ƒ
Lemma A6: For each i  N, T(Ri) is consistent.
Proof: By part (i) of Lemma A5, T(R*) is consistent. Consider any i  N. It follows from
rules (3) and (4) of the definition of the common-reasoning model that T(Ri) can be
partitioned into the subsets T
1
, T
2
and T
3
, defined as follows: T
1
= {p  M(P0) | p = R*(q) for
some q  T(R*)}; T2 = T(R*); T3 = {p  M(P0) | p is logically entailed by, but not contained
in, T
1  T2}. Since T(R*) is consistent, so is T2. Since T1 contains only sentences of the form
R*(.), while T
2
is a consistent set which contains no sentence of the form ¬R*(.), T
1  T2 is
consistent. Since T
3
contains only sentences that are logically entailed by T
1  T2, T1  T2 
T
3
is consistent. Ƒ
)LQDOO\7KHRUHPIROORZVLPPHGLDWHO\IURPSDUWLRI/HPPD$DQG/HPPD$Ƒ
Proof of Theorem 5: Consider any profile D of decision rules for any game in G. Part (i) of
Theorem 5 follows from Proposition A3, together with part (i) of Proposition A1. Now,
define the common-reasoning model with D as its common standard of practical rationality
and let R* be common reason in this model. To establish part (ii) of Theorem 5, we have to
show that the sentences in the set {p  T(R*) | p is a permissibility sentence} are precisely
those stated by the final output of the recommendation algorithm for D.
To do this, we define the corresponding inference structure R–*, as in the proof of
Theorem 4. By part (ii) of Lemma A5, the set {p  T(R*) | p is a permissibility sentence} is
identical to the set {p  T(R–*) | p is a permissibility sentence}. By Lemma A3, the
VHQWHQFHVLQWKHODWWHUVHWDUHHQFRGHGE\WKHFDWHJRULVDWLRQVROXWLRQIRUWKHJDPHUHODWLYHWRȗ
ZKHUHȗLVWKHDJJUHJDWHFDWHJRULVDWLRQIXQFWLRQZKLFKHQFRGHVD. Finally, by Proposition
A3, the categorisation solution is identical to the categorisation that encodes the combined
ILQDORXWSXWRIWKHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQDOJRULWKPƑ
Proof of Theorem 6: Consider any game in G for which an ICEU Bayesian model exists.
Consider any such model M and let its inclusion categorisation be C
M/HWȗEHWKHDJJUHJDWH
categorisation function which encodes the profile of ICEU decision rules. Let C(0), C(1), ...
be the sequence of categorisations of  LQGXFHGE\WKHFDWHJRULVDWLRQSURFHGXUHIRUȗ
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Lemma A7: For every categorisation C of  : [CM * C] [CM ȗC)].
Proof: For any player i, we define a probability distribution over S–i as ICEU-consistent with
a categorisation C of  if (i) for each strategy profile s–i  S–i, the probability of s–i is the
product of the marginal probabilities of the individual strategies appearing in s–i; (ii) for each
player j z i, for each sj  Sj, if sj is in the positive (resp. negative) component of C, then sj has
strictly positive (resp. zero) marginal probability.
By Lemma A2, if some strategy si  Si is in the positive component of CM, it is
unconditionally EU-maximising, for some probability distribution over S–i that is ICEU-
consistent with C
M
; if it is in the negative component of C
M
, there is some such distribution
for which it is not unconditionally EU-maximising (this is Result 1). Now consider any
categorisation C of  such that CM * C. Since CM * C, every probability distribution over
S–i that is ICEU-consistent with C
M
is also ICEU-consistent with C (this is Result 2).
%HFDXVHȗHQFRGHVWKHSURILOHD of ICEU decision rules, if some strategy si  Si is in the
SRVLWLYHFRPSRQHQWRIȗC), it is unconditionally EU-maximising for every probability
distribution over S–i that is ICEU-consistent with CLILWLVLQWKHQHJDWLYHFRPSRQHQWRIȗC),
it is unconditionally EU-maximising for no such distribution (this is Result 3). Now suppose
Lemma A7 is false. Then, using the fact that, by definition, C
M
is exhaustive: either (i) for
some player i, some strategy si  Si is in the positive component of CM and the negative
FRPSRQHQWRIȗC), or (ii) for some player i, some strategy si  Si is in the negative
component of C
M DQGWKHSRVLWLYHFRPSRQHQWRIȗC). Using Results 1, 2 and 3, it can be
VKRZQWKDWHDFKRIWKHVHSRVVLELOLWLHVLPSOLHVDFRQWUDGLFWLRQƑ
We now complete the proof of the theorem. Trivially, C
M * <,>. By repeated
application of Lemma A7, C
M ȗ,>), CM ȗ>ȗ,>)], and so on. But, by the
initiation and continuation rules for categorisation procedures, <,!ȗ,!ȗ>ȗ,
>)], ... are respectively the categorisations C(0), C(1), C(2), ... induced by the categorisation
SURFHGXUHIRUȗ%\3URSRVLWLRQ$WKLVSURFHGXUHKDOWVDWVRPHILQLWHVWDJHk*. By
Proposition A3, Theorem 5, and the definition of the ICEU common-reasoning solution C*,
C(k*) = C*. Thus, C
M * CƑ
Proof of Theorem 7: Consider any game in G and suppose that its ICEU common-reasoning
solution C* = < *+,  *–> is exhaustive. This implies that  *+ŀSi is non-empty and finite,
for each player i.
We prove part (i) of the theorem by constructing an ordered quintupleM from C* and
then showing that this M is an ICEU Bayesian model of the game. We construct M = <:,
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b(.),I , S, F> as follows, where : is a set of states, and b(Z) = (b1[Z], ..., bn[Z]),I = (I1, ...,
In), S = (S1, ..., Sn) and F = (F1, ..., Fn) are, respectively a behaviour function, an information
structure, a profile of priors and a profile of choiceworthiness functions defined with respect
to :. Set Si* =  *+ŀSi, for each player i, and define S* = S1* u ... u Sn*. Define : so that
there is a one-one mapping from S* onto :; for each s  S*, let Z(s) denote the
corresponding element of :. Thus, by construction, : is non-empty and finite, as required.
Now define the behaviour function b(.) on : so that b(Z[s]) = s, for each s  S*. Define the
information structure I such that, for each player i, for each strategy si  Si*: E(si)  I i. For
each player i, fix any independent prior Si, such that Si(Z) > 0 for all Z  :. Define F so that,
for each player i, for each state Z, Fi(Z) = Si*.
It is immediate that, by construction, M satisfies Independence and Knowledge of
Own Choice. To verify that it also satisfies Caution, consider any distinct i, j  N, any si Si,
and any Z  : such that si Fi(Z). By construction, si Fi(Z) implies si Si*. The event E
such that Z  E  Ij is E(bj(Z)). Because Sj is independent, Sj(E(si)|E) = Sj(E(si)), which is
strictly positive by construction.
Now consider any player i and any strategy si  Si*. As, by Theorem 5 and
Proposition A3, C* is identical to the categorisation solution of the game relative to the
DJJUHJDWHFDWHJRULVDWLRQIXQFWLRQȗZKLFKHQFRGHVDQ\SURILOHRI,&(8GHFLVLRQUXOHVsi is
unconditionally EU-maximising with respect to all probability distributions over S–i which
assign strictly positive probability to strategies in  *+ŀ –i and zero probability to strategies
in  *–ŀ –i. Hence, si is unconditionally EU-maximising with respect to Si. Because Si is
independent, and because of the specification of I i, si is expected utility maximising at every
state Z  :. Now consider any strategy sic  Si*. A parallel argument shows that sic is not
expected utility maximising at any state Z  :. Putting these arguments together: at each
state Z  :, the set of strategies that are SEU-rational for i is Si*. Thus, the specification that
Fi(Z) = Si* for each Z ensures that M satisfies Choice Rationality and SEU-Maximisation.
Consequently, M is an ICEU Bayesian model of the game, so proving part (i) of the theorem.
To prove part (ii) of the theorem, consider any ICEU Bayesian model of the game.
Since its inclusion categorisation C
M
is exhaustive by definition, it follows immediately from
Theorem 6 that, if C* is exhaustive, C
M
= CƑ
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